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PRELIMINARY NOTE 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company's Opening Brief in this case was filed on 
July 25, 1991, pursuant to the Court's grant of a request for a 15-day extension 
after it was discovered that the Public Service Commission had not yet transmitted 
the entire record to the Court. The augmented record had still not been submitted 
by the due date for the opening brief. Accordingly, Mountain Fuel filed its 
opening brief on July 25 with citations to the "raw record" compiled by the PSC, 
with a request to file a "final opening brief upon availability of the record cita-
tions. This final opening brief replaces the original July 25 filing with the correct 
record citations substituted. No textual changes have been made. 
There are still two problems with the record. (1) The pagination from 
pages 1-205 is repeated in Volumes I and II. Therefore, to avoid ambiguity, a 
reference in the following brief to a page between 1 and 205 specifies Volume I 
and Volume II. (2) Despite repeated requests to the Secretary of the PSC, the 
transcript for the first day of the proceedings, November 7, 1989, has not been 
included in the record transmitted to the Court. Because these proceedings are 
important to the Court's understanding of one of the primary issues in the case, 
Mountain Fuel has included a copy of the certified November 7 transcript as 
Addendum 5 to its Final Opening Brief. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY 
COMPANY, 
Petitioner, 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 910051 
OPENING BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY 
[FINAL] 
Petitioner Mountain Fuel Supply Company (Mountain Fuel) respectfully 
submits its initial brief in support of its petition for review of a decision of the 
Public Service Commission of Utah (PSC or the Commission), issuea November 
21, 1990, and its order on rehearing, issued December 31, 1990, in PSC Docket 
No. 89-057-15. (The orders are designated as Addendum 1 to this Brief.) 
INTRODUCTORY MATTERS 
Statement of Jurisdiction. 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16 (1989) and 78-2-2(3)(e)(i) (Supp. 1990). 
Statement of Issues and Standard of Review. 
Mountain Fuel raises two general issues on review: (1) Whether the Public 
Service Commission has unlawfully set utility rates that do not reasonably reflect 
the conditions during the period that the rates will be in effect by basing 1991 
rates exclusively on a "historic test year" 1989, and (2) whether the PSC has, in 
effect, imposed an unlawful penalty on Mountain Fuel by reducing its authorized 
rate of return below that which the PSC found otherwise to be a proper return on 
shareholders' equity. 
The standards for review for the issues in this case are provided by portions 
of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-
16(4) (1989), as set forth in Addendum 2 to this Brief. 
To the extent the issues that Mountain Fuel raises are mixed issues of law 
and fact, § 63-46b-16(4) directly addresses the standard: Relief is to be granted if 
an "agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law." The Utah Court of 
Appeals has indicated that this Court's pre-UAPA analysis of the review of fact/ 
law questions in Utah Dept. of Administrative Services v. PSC, 658 P.2d 601, 610 
(Utah 1983), is consistent with the UAPA's provisions. Pro-Benefit Staffing v. 
Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App. 1989). As articulated in Admin-
istrative Services, the agency is to be accorded less deference than if the review 
involved only the agency's findings of facts; in mixed questions, the inquiry will 
be to see if the agency improperly exercised its discretion in applying the law. 
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Id., citing Comments, Uniform Model State Administrative Procedures Act 
§ 511(c)(4). 
In addition, Mountain Fuel believes that the PSCs order does not pass the 
tests set forth in subsections (4)(b), (d), (g) and (h) of § 63-46b-16, as discussed 
in more detail in the body of the argument. 
Determinative Statutes, Ordinances and Rules. 
In addition to the provisions from the UAPA cited in the previous section, 
the PSC is required to set rates that are "just and reasonable" and for the utilities 
to provide proper services, as those terms are found in Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1 
(1990), and § 54-7-12(2)(b) (1990). (See Addendum 1.) 
Statement of the Case. 
Nature of the Case. Mountain Fuel is a natural gas public utility under 
Title 54 of the Utah Code, and its rates and charges are regulated by the PSC 
pursuant to the provisions of that title and applicable case law. 
This case (PSC Docket No. 89-057-15) has arisen out of proceedings 
initiated by the PSC in 1989 to determine new rates for Mountain Fuel, culminat-
ing in a report and order issued by the PSC on November 21, 1990, establishing 
rates and charges to be effective December 1, 1990. Mountain Fuel believes the 
rates specified by the PSC order are based, in material part, on unlawful proce-
dures, premises and conclusions, the result of which is the failure of the PSC to 
establish just and reasonable rates for Mountain Fuel in accordance with Utah law. 
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Course of the Proceedings and Statement of Facts. By notice of prehearing 
conference issued on October 31, 1989, the PSC, on its own motion, commenced 
an investigation into the rates and charges for the utility services Mountain Fuel 
renders in Utah. (R. 1434-35.) A time-line of events is depicted in Addendum 3 
to this Brief. 
A prehearing conference was held by the PSC on November 7, 1989. As 
the first order of business at the prehearing conference, prior to any discussion, 
the Commission declared its intent to impose a historic test year1 on the develop-
ment of Mountain Fuel's new rates. u[T]he Commission would like to have a 
historical test year in this case, the test year being 1989." (Addendum 5, at 5.) 
The PSC also requested that the parties address the relations of Mountain Fuel 
with that of it affiliates, including its parent company, Questar Corporation and its 
pipeline supplier, Questar Pipeline Company. 
In response to PSC's declaration that Mountain Fuel file on the basis of a 
historic test year, Mountain Fuel sought to file its case using a future test year that 
more nearly matched the period when rates would become effective (the "rate-
effective period"). (Addendum 5, at 15-17.) The Commission set the matter for 
^ e "test year," as used in this proceeding, referred generally to the 12-
month period over which a utility's operations, costs, revenues and investment are 
to be analyzed to determine new rates and charges. (R. 2423, Ex. DPU-10.1, at 
1.) A historic test year is a year in which all events have concluded and books 
and records and other information are available. 
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argument on November 21. 
At the November 21, 1989, oral argument of counsel on the test-year issue 
(R. 3-40, Vol. I), Mountain Fuel sought leave to submit comprehensive evidence 
with its filing concerning its operations for both the years 1990—the future test 
year—and the 1989 calendar year. (Addendum 5, at 6-7.) The Utah Division of 
Public Utilities (Division) concurred with Mountain Fuel's proposal (Addendum 5, 
at 17); the Committee of Consumer Services (Committee) requested that the 1989 
year be used. (R. 23-24, Vol. I.) 
The PSC took no evidence on the test-year issue and issued its bench order 
at the close of the November 21 hearing, rejecting the request of Mountain Fuel 
and the Division and requiring Mountain Fuel to file its case for the determination 
of future rates2 on the basis of the calendar year 1989. No written order was 
issued, and no reasons were articulated at that time by the Commission. (R. 37, 
Vol I.) 
Pursuant to the bench order limiting the test year to 1989, Mountain Fuel 
filed a request for rate relief under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12, on March 31, 
1990, seeking a general annual increase of $9,682,000 in its rates for Utah ser-
2Given the timing of the filing, the earliest that rates were likely to become 
effective would be about December 1, 1990, the expiration of the 240-day limit 
imposed on final Commission action by Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12(3)(b) and (c) 
(1990). Thus, the rate-effective period was likely (and so turned out) to begin in 
December 1990 and run into 1991. 
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vice. (R. 1496-1510.) Within the constraint of a historical test year, Mountain 
Fuel sought to mitigate the effects of a test year nearly two years removed from 
the rate-effective period (1989 v. 1991) by using a 1989 year-end rate base3 and a 
number of post-1989 adjustments to account for known and measurable changes in 
the Company's operations. (R. 2287, Ex. MFS-1R, at 5; R. 2297, 2300, Ex. 
MFS-5, at 7, 10; R. 2346-48, Ex. MFS-5R, at 27-29.) 
Following extensive discovery, several rounds of prepared, written testimo-
ny and other preliminary matters, evidentiary hearings began September 5, 1990, 
and concluded September 18, 1990. Oral argument was conducted on Septem-
ber 28, 1990, and the PSC issued a report and order on November 21, 1990 (the 
Order), establishing new rates for Mountain Fuel, to be effective December 1, 
1990. The new rates were based on an annual revenue requirement of 
$139,533,000 (exclusive of the costs of natural gas), only $76,000 more than 
existing rates had been designed to produce. 
To establish Mountain Fuel's rates for 1991 (and December 1990) the 
Order incorporated, among other things: 
(a) Operations and costs for the year 1989, purportedly rejecting all 
post-1989 adjustments (R. 1968, 1972); 
(b) A rate base (depreciated investment base) calculated by taking an 
average over 1989 (R. 1969-70); 
3
"Rate base" is the investment base on which the Company is entitled to earn 
a return. 
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(c) A rate of return on shareholders' equity of 12.1%, which incor-
porated a .1% reduction "adjustment" related to the existence of transac-
tions Mountain Fuel engages in with affiliate companies (R. 1992-93). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-7-15 (1990) and 63-46b-12 (1989), 
Mountain Fuel sought rehearing of the November 21, 1990, order. (R. 2094-
2133.) On January 10, 1991, the PSC issued its Order on Application for Re-
hearing, denying Mountain Fuel's requests.4 (R. 2161-65.) 
Summary of the Argument. 
The improper choice of test year and rate base. The main thrust of Moun-
tain Fuel's position is that the PSC has not carried out its responsibilities to deter-
mine "just and reasonable rates" under applicable law, because it has improperly 
excluded evidence designed to exhibit the conditions that would exist when the 
new rates were to be effective. There is not substantial evidence nor proper 
findings to establish that the 1989 historical test-year data used by the PSC was 
properly representative of the rate-effective period. The rates imposed by the 
Commission are the result of improper exclusion of evidence, improper applica-
tion of the Utah Public Utility Code and interpretative case law, and action that 
does not comport with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
Rate of return reduction. Having found a return of 12.20% to be a proper 
Section 3 of the order on rehearing gave Mountain Fuel leave to "approach 
the other parties with a view to having [a certain] adjustment stipulated." No such 
stipulation was reached. 
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and lawful return on Mountain Fuel's shareholders' equity, the PSC penalized 
Mountain Fuel by .10% (to 12.10%) because of the Commission's general dis-
pleasure with the corporate organization of Questar Corporation, the parent hold-
ing company of Mountain Fuel, and the affiliate relations that are a part of that 
corporate organization. The Commission's actions are unjustified on the basis of 
the record in this case, and they constitute an abuse of discretion and exercise of 
authority that is beyond its statutory grant. 
DETAILED ARGUMENT 
I. IMPOSITION OF THE HISTORICAL 1989 TEST YEAR, UNAD-
JUSTED FOR ANY POST-1989 INFORMATION, WAS UNLAWFUL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The primary issue in this case involves foundational principles of utility 
ratemaking in the United States: Whether the Public Service Commission may 
impose a condition on the receipt of evidence that forecloses the submission and 
consideration of information and data that the applicant-utility believes to be more 
representative of conditions expected during the rate-effective period; or, equiva-
lent^, whether the PSC can establish just and reasonable rates for a period begin-
ning in December 1990 without any finding that a 1989 historical test year, unad-
justed for post-1989 information, is properly representative of the rate-effective 
period. 
It is undisputed that the ratemaking exercise is forward-looking and that the 
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role and duty of the Public Service Commission is to determine rates that are just 
and reasonable when they become effective. (See cases cited in part B of this 
section.) One of the primary tools in carrying out this duty is the selection of a 
test year, which provides a 12-month period of the utility's operations to be 
analyzed and adjusted, with the goal of representing the period when rates will be 
effective. The Commission itself stated the purpose of the test year accurately: 
"The purpose of a test year, or test period, is to provide revenue, expense, and 
investment information that reasonably approximates circumstances expected 
during the period rates will be in effect." (R. 1968.) 
Having stated the function of a test year properly, and having recognized 
the new rates would not become effective until almost 1991, the PSC proceeded to 
frustrate attempts to reach this goal by prohibiting parties from submitting future-
test-year information concerning the utility's operations beyond December 31, 
1989. In addition, it made no finding that the 1989 test year it had chosen had 
sufficient nexus with or characteristics representative of the rate-effective period 
that it would produce just and reasonable rates. 
Thus, the test-year question is a mixed issue of law and fact. As a legal 
matter, a test year must satisfy fundamental constraints of providing a proper 
representation of the period during which rates will be effect, as discussed in more 
detail below. In determining whether a given test year—whether historical, 
projected, adjusted or hypothetical—passes legal muster, there must be an inquiry 
-9-
into the facts and circumstances. 
Before this brief launches into a detailed discussion of the facts, circum-
stances and legal underpinnings of this case, it may be helpful to state what Moun-
tain Fuel is not asking this Court to do. It is not seeking a judicial mandate that 
the PSC must use a particular form of future test year or other device in order to 
establish just and reasonable rates.6 Rather, this appeal seeks the Court's finding 
that the PSC may not arbitrarily preclude, exclude or fail to consider relevant 
information that parties may wish to submit in establishing just and reasonable 
rates and, in so doing, limit the consideration to a particular historic period. 
Parties should be allowed to present evidence, in the Commission's own words, 
that "reasonably approximates circumstances expected during the period rates will 
be in effect," and the PSC must determine just and reasonable rates for the future 
period on the basis of such evidence. 
5For example, it might be factually established that the utility's operations and 
the latent economic and financial conditions facing it are so stable and unlikely to 
change that an unadjusted historical period would serve as a lawful surrogate for 
the period when rates are effective. In this case, there was no such evidence or 
fining; the evidence was to the contrary, as will be discussed below. Conversely, 
materially changing conditions facing the utility—operationally, economically and 
financially—dictate a different approach. 
6See, e.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Utah Power 
& Light Co. v. PSC, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542, 558 (1944). In particular, a 
historic test year, unadjusted for post-test-year changes is not per se unlawful, 
although the very dynamics of today's changing world suggest that the incorpora-
tion of known changes and expectations will ordinarily produce a more representa-
tive result. 
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Mountain Fuel believes the PSC's complete failure to incorporate consider-
ations of the future rate-effective period is reversible error, 
B. As A MATTER OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW, 
THE PSC IS REQUIRED TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE 
CONCERNING THE COMPANY'S EXPECTED OPERATIONS, 
COSTS AND INVESTMENTS DURING THE RATE-EFFECTIVE PERIOD 
The applicable case law in Utah, as well as in other jurisdictions, has 
recognized the forward-looking nature of the ratemaking process: 
[T]he basic approach in rate making is to take a test year and deter-
mine the revenues, expenses, and investment for the test year. The 
test period results are adjusted to allow for reasonably anticipated 
changes in revenues, expenses, or other conditions in order that the 
test-period results of operations will be as nearly representative of 
future conditions as possible. 
Utah Dept. of Business Regulation, Division of Public Utilities v. PSC9 614 P.2d 
1242, 1248 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). This standard has also been stated and 
restated in virtually every part of the United States in which the question has 
arisen. 
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue some 65 years ago, and the 
principles stated then remain applicable today. In McCardle v. Indianapolis Water 
Co., 272 U.S. 400, 408 (1926), the Court indicated that, in fixing utility rates, 
"there must be an honest and intelligent forecast as to probable price and wage 
levels during a reasonable period in the immediate future." In applying McCardle 
in 1973, the Florida Supreme Court pointed out that "a rate making body . . . 
cannot ignore an existing fact that admittedly will affect the future rates, * Gulf 
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Power Co. v. Bevis, 289 So. 2d 401, 404 (Fla. 1973). But the PSC's foreclosure 
of future-year evidence a fortiori "ignored" facts that the Company wished to 
submit that would "affect the future rates." By limiting the period for which it 
considered information to December 31, 1989, the PSC could not complete its 
duty to determine conditions that were "as nearly representative of future condi-
tions as possible." Dept. of Business Regulations, 614 P.2d at 1248. 
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed similar considerations in West Ohio 
Gas Co. v. PUC, 294 U.S. 79 (1935). In that case, there was unchallenged 
evidence of actual revenue and expenses for two succeeding years beyond the test 
year. But the PSC refused to consider this in fixing new rates, and Justice Car-
dozo wrote: 
We think the adoption of a single year as an exclusive test or stan-
dard imposed upon the company an arbitrary restriction in contraven-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment and of "the rudiments of fair 
play" made necessary thereby. [Citations omitted.] The earnings of 
the later years were exhibited in the record and told their own tale as 
to the possibilities of profit. To shut one 9s eyes to them altogether, 
to exclude them from the reckoning, is as much arbitrary action as to 
build a schedule upon guess work with evidence available. 
Id. at 81-82 (emphasis added). This principle applies directly to the case before 
this Court. In West Ohio Gas, the Commission had the information and ignored 
it; in Mountain Fuel's case, the Commission didn't allow the parties to submit 
data and the information in the first place—in effect, "shutting [their] eyes to 
them altogether." The result is the same. Rates have not been established as just 
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and reasonable. See also Southern New England Telephone Co. v. PUC, 282 
A.2d 915, 918, 29 Conn. Sup. 253 (1970). 
Similar results and principles are stated in other jurisdictions. The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court recently indicated that tt[T]he historical test year rate base, 
expenses, and revenues are only helpfid in the rate-making process where past 
operations are indicative of probable future operations." Central Louisiana Elec-
tric Co. v. PSC, 508 So. 2d 1361, 1369 (La. 1987) (emphasis added). The Loui-
siana court went on to indicate that "test year data should not be looked at in 
isolation or arbitrarily applied," finding that the utility's operations during the test 
year must be examined in order to determine whether they are representative of 
the figures that would prevail in the future. Citing the Gulf Power case in Flori-
da, the Louisiana Court concluded that the test year must "fairly represent the 
future period for which the rates are being fixed." Id. 
But the Utah Commission was having nothing to do with adjustments or any 
finding that the 1989 test year was reasonably representative of the future period. 
To the contrary, the PSC summarily rejected the Company's proffer (R. 4-15, 
Vol. I) to submit evidence concerning the extent to which the year 1989 did or did 
not represent the period when rates would be effective—beginning late 1990 and 
continuing through 1991.7 
The Commission recognized that the rate-effective period would primarily be 
in 1991. "The rates we set in this docket will be in effect in 1991." (R. 1968.) 
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As stated above, the PSC may approach the establishment of rates for the 
future period in more than one way, but it must do so in a way that recognizes the 
forward-looking nature of the exercise and in a way that it is not arbitrary, capri-
cious nor inconsistent with the evidence in the case. 
Here, of course, the Commission short-circuited the process in two differ-
ent areas: (1) It precluded the parties from submitting future test-year information 
at the outset of the proceedings (R. 37, Vol. I), thus preventing Mountain Fuel 
and the Division from attempting to establish on an evidentiary basis the extent to 
which a projected or future test year would be more representative of conditions 
during the period when rates would be in effect than would a 1989 test year. (2) 
It adopted the 1989 test year but rejected all post-1989 adjustments of the parties, 
with no finding that the 1989 test year, unadjusted for any post-period expectations 
or occurrences, was a reasonable representation of the period during which rates 
would become effective. (R. 1966-68, 1971-72.) 
A long line of California cases also develops the governing principle— 
namely, that the test period should provide information that "presents] as nearly 
as possible the operating conditions of the utility which are known or expected to 
obtain during the future months or years for which the Commission proposes to 
fix rates" and that consequently yields estimates that "will be as nearly representa-
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tive of future conditions as possible." City and County of San Francisco v. PUC, 
39 Cal. 3d 523, 703 P.2d 381, 387 (1985), quoting Pacific Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. v. PUC, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 401 P.2d 353 (1965). 
Indiana cases yield the same result. 
The theory underlying the use of any test-year and adjustment meth-
od in the rate-making process demands that the data used provide an 
accurate picture of the utility's operations during the period in which 
the proposed rates will be in effect. . . . Significant changes in a 
utility's operating structure, such as rapid plant expansion, may 
render even the most current historical data inadequate as a basis for 
predicting the results of future operations. 
L. S. Ayres & Co. v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 169 Ind. App. 652, 351 
N.E.2d 814, 828-29 (1976) (emphasis added; emphasis of "any" in original). 
Here, the Utah PSC has precluded the parties from making such a showing, 
and it has itself not made any finding that there is a connection between the 1989 
period and the Company's future operations. In the Ayres case, the Court found 
that "the selection of a test year and the adoption of an adjustment method are 
complex issues of regulatory policy which must be resolved in light of the special 
facts of each case." 351 N.E.2d at 830 (emphasis added). Factual showings 
were denied by the Utah PSC. It avoided this issue by prohibiting the parties 
from presenting "special facts" and compounded the problem by rejecting what 
information was available to make post test-year adjustments to 1989 to make it 
more reflective of 1991. 
Not only does the overwhelming weight of judicial precedent render the 
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PSC's test-year actions to be unlawful, but every witness who addressed the sub-
ject of an appropriate test year reconfirmed the forward-looking nature of the 
exercise and indicated that the test year should reasonably reflect the conditions 
that will be in existence at the time that rates will become effective. Company 
witness Glenn H. Robinson addressed the issue in his direct and cross-examination 
testimony (R. 2256-57, Ex. MFS-1, at 4-5; R. 213), as did James L. Balthaser 
(R. 57, Vol. II). So did witnesses for the Division and Committee: Chester 
Sullivant (Ex. DPU-1, at 12), Carl L. Mower R. 99, Vol. H; R. 487; R. 2415-16, 
Ex. DPU-10, at 12-13); Michael Arndt (R. 680). 
To the same end, Committee witness Mattiyahu Marcus and Division 
witness Nile Eatmon unequivocally indicated that the determination of the cost of 
equity capital for the utility is a forward-looking exercise that determines the cost 
of capital for iht future period.8 This last point is of more than passing signifi-
cance. The Commission makes much of the necessity for matching (in time) 
investment, revenues, expenses and the other ratemaking elements (R. 1964), but 
8This exchange took place with the Division's rate-of-return witness, Mr. 
Eatmon: 
Q. Now, is it correct that you endeavored to determine the 
cost of capital for Mountain Fuel Supply Company for the period 
during which rates, the new rates for Mountain Fuel, would t 
effect? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(R. 725.) See also Dr. Marcus's testimony to the same effect. (R. 279.) 
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it never addresses the fact that its historical test-year approach provides an auto-
matic mismatch with the cost of equity capital, which is indisputably determined 
for the future period. 
Finally, even the Committee of Consumer Services, a state agency that has 
vigorously taken the position that would focus on a period that yields the smallest 
possible revenue requirement—the historical test year—attempted to support its 
position by citing a New York Public Service Commission policy statement on 
test-period issues that restates the fundamental principle: 
[0]ur goal in setting rates would be to ascertain, as best we could, 
what the utility's revenues, operating expenses, and conditions would 
be in the period for which we were setting rates: the first twelve 
months after the new rates became effective. 
Re: Test Periods in Rate Cases, 22 P.U.R.4th 611, 612 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1977) 
(emphasis added). The PSC did not do "the best it could" in looking to the rate-
effective period. Had it done so, it would have allowed parties to submit evidence 
as they saw fit to establish new rates, and the Commission would then have made 
the judgment, with all available information, of the conditions most representative 
of the rate-effective period. 
Notwithstanding the unanimous agreement among the parties and the PSC 
itself that rates are to be determined from information that characterizes the reve-
nues, operating expenses, investment and other conditions that would be facing the 
utility during the rate-effective period, the Commission resolutely refused to 
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entertain information and evidence concerning the rate-effective period and make 
adjustments to 1989 data with post-1989 information that was in the record. 
C. THERE IS NO FINDING OR EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING THAT 
THE 1989 TEST YEAR IMPOSED BY THE PSC REASONABLY 
REPRESENTS CONDITIONS DURING THE RATE-EFFECTIVE PERIOD. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act requires that agency action be 
based on usubstantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989). This Court has defined substantial evidence 
as "that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a 
reasonable mind to support a conclusion." First National Bank of Boston v. 
County Board of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (1990), Grace Drilling Co. v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989) elaborated somewhat: 
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of evi-
dence . . . though 'something less than the weight of the evidence.'" 
[Citation omitted.] "Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion.'" 
There are two dimensions to the no-substantial-evidence analysis in this 
case: First, with no evidence in hand, the PSC rejected parties' attempts to file 
and analyze future test-year data to determine the future rates. Second, having 
constrained the parties to a base test year of 1989, it rejected all proposals to 
make adjustments based on post-1989 data and information. In the first instance, 
there is an automatic failure of the substantial-evidence test; the fact-marshalling 
exercise called for in Bank of Boston, 799 P.2d at 1165, produces an empty 
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collection; and § 63-46b-16(4)(g)9 applies directly. 
At the second level, the PSC still comes up short. Even after imposing a 
1989 test year on the determination of 1991 rates, it further rejected all post-1989 
adjustments. (R. 1971-72.) But this carries the implicit conclusion that the 
unadjusted 1989 test year "reasonably approximates circumstances expected during 
the period rates will be in effect" (the PSC's own words). Yet the PSC made no 
such finding; it never "demonstrate^] that there is a logical and legal basis for the 
ultimate conclusion." Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. PSC, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 
(Utah 1986). Indeed, it could not. The dynamics of today's fast-moving energy 
and utility businesses dictate that, lacking an affirmative evidentiary demonstration 
that 1989's conditions reasonably model or represent 1990's, an unadjusted test 
year cannot be "as nearly representative of future conditions as possible." Dept. 
of Business Regulations, 614 P.2d at 1248. 
Recognizing that it "must marshall all of the evidence supporting the find-
ings," 799 P.2d at 1165, Mountain Fuel can find no reference in the PSC order 
that cites any evidence connecting the 1989 test year with the conditions that will 
exist in 1991. To put it another way, no party's evidence addressed this key 
linkage, and there is, accordingly, no substantial evidence to show that the PSC 
9Relief will be granted if "the agency action is based on a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." 
-19-
has carried out its responsibility in determining just and reasonable rates for 
Mountain Fuel for the rate-effective period. 
The absence of evidence (much less substantial evidence) that would estab-
lish the connection between the 1989 test year and the rate-effective period is 
fundamental and crucial. It is precisely the type of situation that the UAPA and 
interpreting case law is designed to proscribe. The PSC has pursued an exercise 
that is foundational^ defective: There is no substantial evidence that establishes 
the 1989 historical test year as a reasonable representative of the conditions that 
are facing Mountain Fuel and its current operations. 
Indeed, the only hard evidence that attempts to connect the 1989 test year 
with the 1991 period during which rates are effective cuts in the other direction. 
Company witness Mr. Robinson sponsored an exhibit showing that there is still an 
inflationary trend (R. 2279, Ex. MFS-1.5) and that the future test year is a better 
match than the historical test year under the conditions facing Mountain Fuel at 
this time (R. 2256, Ex. MFS-1, at 4). Carl L. Mower testified that "If properly 
done, the forecasted test year would probably be more accurate than a historical 
one. . . . " (R. 492 [emphasis added].) Mountain Fuel and the Division were 
denied the opportunity to "properly do" such a test year. 
The significance of the inflation information is that it tends to disprove any 
claim that, because inflation levels are less than they were five years ago (which 
Mountain Fuel concedes), the rate-setting exercise does not need to move forward 
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with more recent information. This is a tenuous argument at best if there were no 
inflation driving up the costs of goods and services; however, it is almost axiomat-
ic that inflation levels of the size indicated by Mr. Robinson (and not disputed by 
any witness) will cause costs to increase.10 Thus, the PSC's action in refusing 
to allow parties to submit future-year information or other forms of evidence to 
show that the rate-effective period is not adequately represented by the 1989 
historical test year, coupled with the rejection of all post-1989 adjustments, fails 
the substantial-evidence test under the UAPA. Failure of this test renders the 
Commission's actions unlawful.11 
D. THE PSC'S FORECLOSURE OF THE PARTIES' 
SUBMISSION OF PROJECTED OR FUTURE TEST YEAR EVIDENCE 
WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS UNDER THE UAPA 
AND A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act declares agency action that is 
arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion to be unlawful. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) and (iv) (1989). To the extent that the PSC has some 
discretion in adopting methods that will produce just and reasonable rates,12 
10Whether or not there might be offsetting effects is not the point here. If 
there are, than the parties would presumably submit evidence to establish the point 
one way or another. Here, again, the Commission foreclosed the parties from 
making such showings. 
nMountain Fuel believes that the Commission's action would also fail the less 
stringent test applied to the review of agency decisions prior to the UAPA. See, 
e.g., Dept. of Administrative Services v. PSC, 658 P.2d 601, 608-09 (Utah 1984). 
12For example, through Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(3) (1990). 
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Mountain Fuel believes it has nevertheless abused that discretion by its action in 
decreeing a 1989 historical test year and foreclosing the presentation of evidence 
by the parties concerning a projected test year. 
By any standard, the Commission's decision that it intended to require a 
1989 historical test year, before hearing argument and to the exclusion of any 
testimony or other evidence, was an arbitrary and capricious decision. It is not 
action that would be taken by reasonable persons with knowledge and understand-
ing of the substantive issues. A reading of the transcripts for November 7 and 
November 21, 1990, indicates the PSC's predisposition toward a 1989 test year, 
independent of the urging of all parties that such an imposition was a factual 
determination that had no evidentiary support. (R. 21, 23, 29, Vol. I.) 
Even during the hearings, Division witness Mr. Mower indicated that it 
would be better to roll the test year ahead by six months than to be restricted to 
using 1989 data. (R. 2413, Ex. DPU-10, at 10; R. 1967.) But the PSC opted 
not to adopt his suggestion. 
The PSC was quick to saddle Mountain Fuel with the burden of establishing 
its new rates in this proceeding (Addendum 5, at 5, 22), notwithstanding that the 
Commission had initiated the investigation into Mountain Fuel's rates. The Com-
pany did not take issue with this burden,13 but then was forced to operate under 
13By its acquiescence, Mountain Fuel does not necessarily concede that, in a 
case in which the PSC or other party initiates rate investigation, the utility compa-
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Commission-imposed evidentiary constraints that precluded it from making its best 
case for a proper rate determinations for the rate-effective period. Such action is, 
in the first instance, a denial of due process under the section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and the Utah Constitution, art. 1, § 7;14 
and it is arbitrary or capricious, as this phase ordinarily construed. See, e.g., 
Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 758 P.2d 957, 960 (Utah App. 1988) ("without 
any reasonable basis in the evidence"). 
The PSC may argue that it is not required to use a particular form of future 
test year in the determination of just and reasonable rates. Strictly speaking, this 
is correct.15 But that does not give it unlimited license to preclude the utility 
company (or any other party) from presenting relevant evidence that would tend to 
show that the applicable legal standard is satisfied with appropriate projections or 
future-year analyses. The Commission may further argue that, in the absence of 
the use of a future test year, it is entitled to limit appropriate adjustments to the 
historical test-year information. In some factual instances, this also may be cor-
rect. But no facts were developed to establish such a result, and this, too, does 
ny always has the affirmative burden of establishing or re-establishing the justness 
and reasonableness of its rates. In this case, however, Mountain Fuel requested a 
rate increase and thereby undertook a certain burden of proof. 
14Additionally, this means that UAPA § 63-46b-16(4)(e) has not been satisfied 
("the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure"). 
15Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(3) (1990) addresses the test-year choice and indi-
cates, "The commission may adopt an appropriate future test period." 
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not give the PSC authority to sweep away all post-test-period adjustments, leaving 
the utility's rates to be set on the basis of information that is almost two years 
removed from the actual rate-effective period.16 
In sum, the PSC's exclusion of evidence that would allow it to determine 
revenues, expenses and other conditions "as nearly representative of future condi-
tions as possible" was arbitrary and capricious17 and a denial of due process. 
E. THE COMMISSION'S UNSUPPORTED REJECTION OF 
A FUTURE TEST YEAR IS A DEPARTURE FROM PAST 
PRACTICE THAT IS PROSCRIBED BY THE UAPA. 
Since the mid-1970's, when utility rates and energy prices began to escalate 
rapidly for a variety of reasons, Mountain Fuel has filed seven requests for gener-
al rate relief under appropriate Public Utility Code provisions on the basis of fore-
casted or fiiiture test years. These applications were supported by projections of 
existing conditions for a future rate-effective period, with the incorporation of 
known changes, trends and other techniques and information. The PSC has heard 
these cases on that basis and has, by its orders, approved the use of these tech-
16The untenable position that the Company was put in is illustrated at page 6 
of the Order, where the Commission notes that the Division agreed that "the best 
solution is to move the test period forward in time, nearer to the period rates will 
be in effect." The Commission then noted that "This cannot be done," because 
"we have ordered a 1989 test year." This has a distinct Catch 22 cast to it. 
17See page 27-28, infra, for a further discussion of the arbitrary-and-capri-
cious standard as applied to the PSC's after-the-fact rationalization of the historic-
year choice. 
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niques in every case.18 
Mr. Robinson testified to the general development of these matters. 
(R. 2256, Ex. MFS-1, at 4; see also counsel discussion, R. 5-7, Vol. I.) Mr. 
Mower, testifying for the Division, indicated that the Division had experienced no 
major problems with past Mountain Fuel forecasting. (R. 510.) This is signifi-
cant, as Mr. Mower has been with the Division of Public Utilities for many years 
(R. 2404, Ex. DPU-10, at 1) and has participated in many utility rate cases during 
that time. 
The previous methods that have been used since the mid-1970's involved 
forecasted test years, with projections based on trending, statistical extrapolation, 
case-by-case analysis and consideration of known events for future periods. As 
discussed below, the reasons given by the PSC for abandoning a 15-year-old 
policy do not constitute a "fair and rational basis" for changing the policy. The 
PSC has articulated "reasons" that are post-facto justifications for an action that is 
contrary not only to past practice but to bedrock principles of utility ratemaking. 
F. WHEN THE RECORD IS CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE AND 
ALL THE EVIDENCE IS MARSHALLED, THE PSC'S 
TEST-YEAR CHOICE VIOLATES UAPA § 63-46B-16 
This Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have interpreted the UAPA to 
18Addendum 4 contains a table of general rate proceedings filed by Mountain 
Fuel since 1975, showing docket numbers, order dates and references to adoption 
of the future test year. 
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require that a party aggrieved by an administrative action must "marshall all of the 
evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, the 
[agency's] findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Boston First Na-
tional, 799 P.2d at 1165, citing, e.g., Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68. 
The simplest treatment of this standard is to iterate that the PSC took no 
evidence when it rendered its decision on the test-year question, and there are, 
accordingly, no facts to marshall. On an issue that has a factual foundation,19 
the absence of any record evidence to support the finding and conclusion that a 
historic test year was a proper constraint constitutes a per se failure of the 
UAPA's substantial-evidence test. The PSC's action on November 7 and 21, 
1989, is directly subject to this Court's admonition in First National Bank: 
Although it is a "universally recognized rule" that this court must 
"take some cognizance of the expertise of the agency in its particular 
field and accordingly give some deference to its determination," the 
agency's decision must rest upon some sound evidentiary basis, not a 
creation of fiat. 
799 P.2d at 1166, citing Hurley v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 
1988). The PSC's test-year choice was, in every sense of the phrase, "by fiat." 
Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider the rationale set forth in the Com-
mission's final order on the issue: aOur principal reason for this choice [historic 
test year] was to avoid bogging down in debates about the adequacy of future test 
19The three major parties agreed on this. (R. 21, 23, 29, Vol. I.) 
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year forecasting techniques at the very time we were endeavoring to learn the 
actual circumstances of a utility we had not thoroughly examined for some years." 
(R. 1965 [emphasis added].) 
The Utah Court of Appeals has suggested that the arbitrary-and-capricious 
standard of the UAPA is a sort of "catch-alT that would generally yield the right 
of way to one of the Act's more substantive provisions (e.g., erroneous applica-
tion of the law). Angell v. Board of Review, 750 P.2d 611, 612 n.2 (Utah App. 
1988). Yet, it strikes Mountain Fuel that the Commission's stated primary reason 
for foreclosing consideration of the future test year is a classic example of unlaw-
ful arbitrariness and caprice. In addition to the implicit admission that the princi-
pal reason for foreclosing the presentation of future-year evidence was motivated 
by non-evidentiary considerations—a direct violation of UAPA § 63-46b-14(4)(g), 
Boston First National, and a host of case law—the PSC's rationale directly im-
plies that the task of determining just and reasonable rates is dependent on (1) the 
Commission's convenience—its desire not to get "bogged down" in the very 
details that it has a duty to examine under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12(2)(b), and 
(2) the absence of a major Mountain Fuel rate proceeding since 1985. 
It is not reasonable to deny parties an opportunity to present evidence 
designed to satisfy the legal standard of representing, as accurately as possible, the 
conditions that will exist when the rates are in effect. The Commission's stated 
reasons are simply unrelated to its duty and responsibility to determine just and 
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reasonable rates. Furthermore, even if the "bog-down factor" were a proper 
consideration, there was no evidence on this point. There were no allegations or 
claims that a consideration of a future test year would produce an unmanageably 
burdensome proceeding. 
Indeed, circumstantial evidence and representations of the Division's coun-
sel are to the contrary. In all Mountain Fuel rate cases since the mid-1970s, the 
future test year was the foundation for the determination of just and reasonable 
rates, and there has been no finding that the rigors of using a future test year are 
outweighed! by the convenience of the Commission or the parties. 
It is significant that the Division, which bears the lion's share of the re-
sponsibility for a rate-case investigation, Utah Code Ann. § 54-4a-l (1990), and 
might have had occasion to grouse about the burdens of a future test year, took no 
exception to the Company's proposal to file on the future-year basis. To the 
contrary, the Division actively supported it, indicating that it would find the future 
test-year filing helpful in analyzing the extent historical information was indicative 
of the future period. (R. 17, 33-34, Vol. I.) The Commission's conjecture that it 
would get "bogged down" in arguments about the future test year was, at best, 
irrelevant speculation and, at worst, an after-the-fact construct for an arbitrarily 
imposed prohibition.20 Mountain Fuel believes this is the sort of action that is 
20It's interesting to note that one Commissioner remarked that there would 
probably be as much disagreement about historic test-year adjustments as there 
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proscribed in § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv). 
Another part of the PSC's rationale is "because of the unusually and unde-
sirably long time that has passed since our last rate case examination of this 
utility." (R. 1966.) The PSC never explains why a five-year period of rate 
stability over which the Company did not need to seek general rate relief is "unde-
sirable." To the contrary, the Commission "attribute[d] this, in part, to be a 
result of the quality management of the company." In effect, the PSC's message 
is: If the Company manages its business prudently and efficiently and avoids 
seeking general relief for an extended period, its absence is "undesirable," and it 
is denied the opportunity to bring future-test-year evidence before the Commission 
in an attempt to exhibit the conditions that will exist during the new rate-effective 
period. It's difficult to understand this Through-the-Looking-Glass reasoning. 
The PSC also states that "historical data has the advantages of simplicity 
and accountability." (R. 1966.) A demurrer might be inserted here: Concede 
the fact that there is something simpler than the consideration of the expected 
future operations of the utility; what does this have to do with applying the legal 
test of establishing just and reasonable rates? The answer is: Little or nothing. 
Simplicity of derivation is not generally a valid criterion for setting lawful rates. 
would have been about the future test year: "The historic test year is something 
we haven't dealt with for quite some time and I can see almost an argument about 
what's a known and measurable change as I can about what's a future test 
year " (R. 38, Vol. I.) 
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This irrelevant observation does not address the legal responsibility before the 
PSC. Particularly in the absence of any evidence that connects " simplicity and 
accountability" with establishing the conditions that will exist when the rates are in 
effect, the PSC's rationale does not pass the tests of UAPA §§ 63-46b-16(4)(g), 
(h)(i) and (h)(iv). 
Finally, the PSC order states that "Our analysis of the principal argument 
in favor of a future test year, the adverse impact of inflation, convinced us that it 
was not persuasive at this time." In the first place, the PSC does not divulge its 
analysis. Although the agency may be accorded some deference in matters of a 
technical nature, it must provide "subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the 
critical subordinate factual issues are highlighted and resolved in such a fashion as 
to demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions." 
Milne, 720 P.2d at 1378. Here, the Commission states a conclusion that is devoid 
of explanation. 
The PSC's inflation syllogism is nothing more than: (1) the existence of 
inflation is the primary reason that a future test year would be used, (2) inflation 
isn't a problem for Mountain Fuel, and (3) therefore, there is no justification for 
using (or examining, apparently) the future test year. There are at least two major 
flaws to this logic. 
First, the PSC's decision at the outset of the proceedings was not accompa-
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nied by any evidentiary discussion of inflation (nor "attrition"21) nor whether 
there was an inflationary effect on Mountain Fuel's revenues and profits. The 
PSC cannot credibly argue that it rejected the future test year because of the 
absence of inflation—an evidentiary conclusion. There was no evidence one way 
or the other when the Commission made the decision.22 
Second, and perhaps more important, no legal principle or evidentiary chain 
of logic establishes the PSC's claim that inflation is the primary reason for using a 
future test year. The applicable legal principle—that rates are to be established 
for a future period—does not depend on the existence of inflation or attrition. In 
the legion of cases cited earlier in this brief establishing the legal foundation for a 
proper test year, the existence of inflation or attrition is never cited as a necessary 
condition for using a future test year.23 
When the reasons for the PSC's test-year decisions are marshalled, they do 
not constitute—even after the fact—the quantum of evidence that is required by 
UAPA § 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
21
"Attrition" was later defined in the proceedings as "a loss in the earnings of 
the Company due to increasing costs." (R. 506.) 
22Subsequent evidence indicated that there is, and has been, ongoing inflation. 
See text pages 20-21. The Order implied (or assumed) that there was no inflation. 
^It may, however, be a sufficient condition. That is, the existence of an 
attrition of earnings due to rising costs may, by itself, establish the need for a 
future test year. But the Commission appears to confuse necessary conditions 
with sufficient conditions in its arguments. 
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G. THE COMMISSION'S ORDER TO USE AN AVERAGE 
RATHER THAN A YEAR-END RATE BASE 
Is NOT BASED ON SUFFICIENT RECORD EVIDENCE. 
The issue of rate base is a subissue of the broader question of whether the 
PSC has properly applied the law to the facts of the case to produce just and 
reasonable rates for the rate-effective period. To the extent that the Commission's 
constraint confining the parties' filings to a historic 1989 test year is itself unlaw-
ful, the rate-base question is subsumed by such an infirmity. This discussion in 
this section, however, examines the rate-base issue's individual elements to show 
that, even by itself, this issue was decided wrongly by the Commission. To put it 
another way, the PSC's choice of rate base methodology aggravated an already 
unlawful ratemaking framework. 
The purpose of the rate base is to establish the value of the utility's assets 
on which it may earn its authorized rate of return during the rate-effective period. 
Having imposed a historical test year on the parties, the PSC later singled out the 
rate base for further consideration: whether, in the context of the 1989 test year, 
an average or year-end rate base was appropriate. Mountain Fuel made its April 
30, 1990 filing on the basis of the value of the Company's rate base on December 
31, 1989 (the "year-end rate base"). (R. 2297, Ex. MFS-5, at 7.) The Division 
was amenable to this approach (R. 2423-25, Ex. DPU-10.1, at 1-3), but the 
Committee took the position that the rate base should be determined by taking an 
average over 1989 (the "average rate base") (R. 680). This approach has the 
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effect of providing the value of the investment base at mid-year, or approximately 
July 1, 1989—six months further in the past than a year-end value. (R. 65-66, 
VoL H; R. 2424, Ex. DPU-10.1, at 2.) 
If a utility's conditions are static over time, it will not matter what type of 
rate base is employed. However, if conditions are changing over time, then the 
type of rate base becomes critical, particularly where a test-year framework has 
already been selected which inherendy provides a material mismatch between the 
test year and the rate-effective period. Thus, the issue of which rate base to use— 
as with the test-year issue itself—comprises both legal and factual components. 
Given the PSC's requirement of a 1989 test year, what rate-base evaluation meth-
od will best meet the legal standard of determining just-and-reasonable rates for 
the rate-effective period? 
The Commission adopted an average rate base, stating three reasons in its 
order. (R. 1968-69.) First, the Commission had apparently adopted an average 
rate base methodology in the most recent U. S. West Communications and Utah 
Power & Light Company rate cases. Second, the Commission claimed that an 
average rate base allows matching of revenues and expenses, and that a year-end 
rate base creates a potentially misleading picture of the rate base at one point in 
time. Third, the Commission found that the use of year-end rate base requires 
substantial, difficult adjustments to revenues and expenses. 
None of these reasons singly or in concert is sufficient to support the 
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conclusion that an average, historic-year rate base should have been used in this 
case. Other than a conclusory statement, the Commission made no finding, nor 
cited evidence to support a finding, that the average, historic rate base combined 
with an unadjusted 1989 test year would provide proper matching of rates with the 
rate-effective period. 
The Company's circumstances are different from those of Utah Power 
& Light and U. S. West. 
The PSC found "no compelling reason" to change from the average rate 
base used in recent U.S. West and Utah Power & Light Company. If the rate 
base issue were purely legal, then the use of those two precedents might be justi-
fied. However, as there are factual components, the holding must be based not 
only on applicable law, but also on substantial evidence. The difficulty with the 
holding is that it is not based on any factual determination. The PSC provided no 
discussion—evidentiary or otherwise—to explain why Mountain Fuel's factual 
circumstances are governed by the PSC's treatment of two other utility companies. 
Consistency for the sake of consistency is not a substitute for reasoned decision-
making and evidence-based conclusions. See generally Milne, 720 P.2d at 
1378-79. 
Although it is true that the Commission regulates Mountain Fuel under the 
same public utility code as it does U.S. West and Utah Power & Light, it does not 
follow that their circumstances are similar enough to require the use of the same 
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rate-base analysis. In fact, Mountain Fuel witness Mr. Robinson testified that 
both U.S. West and Utah Power & Light have stable or declining rate bases, 
whereas Mountain Fuel's rate base is increasing; therefore, a year-end historic 
rate base is more appropriate than an average historic rate base.24 (R. 212-13.) 
It is confiscatory to use average, historic rate base when actual year-end and 
current rate base and investment on the Company's books represent a higher value 
that is closer to the rate-effective period.25 
A year-end rate base (for a historic test-year) provides a more accu-
rate view of conditions for the rate-effective period. 
Within the constraint of the PSC-imposed 1989 test year, the appropriate 
question is: Under the factual circumstances facing Mountain Fuel, does the aver-
age rate base or the year-end rate base better represent the conditions the utility 
will face during the rate-effective period? The PSC's characterization of the year-
end rate base as a "snapshot" is not inapt. But, contrary to the Commission's 
implication, this is not a negative consideration. In contrast to such ratemaking 
elements as costs, which are sums usually aggregated over a 12-month period, the 
rate base is inherently a "snapshot" quantity; at any moment, it represents the 
24This argument is made in the context of the Commission's imposition of a 
historic test year. An average rate base in an appropriate future or forward test 
year may be a proper means of evaluating the utility's investment for the rate-
effective period. 
^Conversely, with a historic test year and declining rate base, use of average 
rate base will produce inappropriately high rates. 
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capital dedicated to the utility operation. 
Thus, the "snapshot" of the rate base that is closer in time to the rate-effec-
tive period will have a better chance of matching the quantity of investor funds 
with the rate-effective period.26 Division witness Mr. Mower hit the legal test 
right on the button: "The rate base and level of operations of the Company are 
still increasing and the end of the year levels will better match the time period that 
rates will be in effect." (R.2425, Ex. DPU 10.1, at 3.) The PSC ignored this 
crucial test in favor of its claims about "difficult adjustments, fraught with policy 
implications." As Mr. Mower testified, any "difficult adjustments" had been 
made, and there is no indication of what "policy implications" would stand in the 
way of updating the rate base. As indicated on page 9, line 4, of Jt. Ex. 2, dated 
September 26, 1990, use of an average-year calculation reduces the rate base by 
$9,542,000. 
Use of a year-end rate base moves the measure of investment forward by 
six months, as the average rate-base approach effectively uses mid-year levels. 
(R. 65-66, Vol. II.) Two Mountain Fuel witnesses and two Division witnesses 
testified that a year-end rate base would more accurately reflect actual conditions, 
because, among other things, the data is moved forward six months. 
(Mr. Robinson, R. 212-13; Mr. Balthaser, R. 69, Vol. II; Mr. Mower, R. 85-86, 
26See note 8 and accompanying text concerning the forward-looking nature of 
the rate-of-return determination. 
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Vol. H; R. 507; R. 2419, Ex. DPU-10, at 16; and Mr. SuUivant, R. 527.) No 
one testified that the average rate base was more representative than the year-end 
rate base for the rate-effective period. 
The necessary calculations were made to support a year-end rate 
base. 
Even if a year-end rate base "requires that substantial, difficult adjustments, 
fraught with policy implications, be made to revenues and expenses" (R. 1969), 
this is not sufficient to reject a year-end rate base unless it is apparent from the 
record that such calculations cannot or have not been made. The record in this 
case establishes the contrary. Most notably, in response to questions from the 
Commission, Mr. Mower clearly stated that the Division had made the necessary 
calculations for this case. (R. 86, Vol. II.) 
More to the point, the Commission's implication that a historic year-end 
rate base "requires that substantial, difficult adjustment, fraught with policy impli-
cations, be made" is not consistent with the evidence in this case. Mr. Mower's 
grudging "comfort level" for an average historic rate base27 is not the relevant 
consideration. In this case, the calculations had been made; the year-end informa-
tion was available and a part of the record; and year-end rate base moved closer 
to satisfying the fundamental requirement of matching rates with rate-effective 
period conditions. 
27R. 1969; R. 86-87. 
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The Committee offered no evidentiary support for the use of an aver-
age rate base. 
The Committee's evidentiary support for an average rate base was virtually 
non-existent. The Committee withdrew its initial submittal on average rate base 
(Tr. 101-03, Vol. II), leaving only Committee witness Michael L. Arndt's testi-
mony. Mr. Arndt summarized his position on average test-year approach 
(R. 654): 
The average test year approach is consistent with prior Commission 
rulings and produces the desired matching of investment, revenues 
and expenses. The year end test period approach, on the other hand, 
focuses on a single point in time and requires numerous year end 
adjustments to achieve the necessary and proper matching of invest-
ment, revenues and expenses. 
Such adjustments are complex, speculative and contrary to the 
Commission's intent to simplify the ratemaking process. 
These are conclusory statements without any factual support in the record. 
It is significant that nowhere in the record did Mr. Arndt or any other witness 
indicate that the year-end rate base was not calculable. Indeed, as indicated by 
Mr. Mower, those calculations were made by the Company and the Division. The 
simple assertion that calculations need to be made is not by itself sufficient to 
support the rejection of a year-end rate base. To the extent that the calculations 
employ more recent data, they should be made as a matter of course if it results in 
a better matching of rates with the conditions in the rate-effective period. 
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H. THE REDUCTION OF THE RATE OF RETURN ON EQUITY FROM 
12.2% TO 12.1% ON THE BASIS OF MOUNTAIN FUEL'S AFFILIATE 
RELATIONSHIPS IS UNLAWFUL. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On pages 23-30 of the Order (R. 1985-92), The PSC discusses the appro-
priate rate of return on common shareholders' equity and concludes: "[W]e find 
the cost of equity to be 12.2%." (R. 1991.) Although Mountain Fuel may not 
necessarily agree that this level is satisfactory, it has not taken legal issue with this 
determination. However, the PSC did not permit Mountain Fuel to file and 
charge rates on the basis of the 12.2% that the Commission found to represent the 
cost of equity in the ratemaking equation. 
Instead, it "imposefd] an adjustment in the form of a reduction in the 
allowed rate of return of 10 basis points"—from 12.2% to 12.1%.28 (R. 1993.) 
The reason given for this "adjustment" is that "we [the PSC] take issue with the 
management of the company's parent, Questar Corporation." (R. 1992.) On 
rehearing, the PSC partially justified its return adjustment on the basis that "set-
ting rates . . . is not a precise science" and that, in any event, 12.1% is within the 
"zone of reasonable rates" established for rate of return. (R. 2163-64.) 
One basis point = .01%. 
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B. IMPOSITION OF A PENALTY REDUCTION OF THE ALLOWED 
RATE OF RETURN IS, AS A MATTER OF LAW, BEYOND 
THE STATUTORY GRANT OF AUTHORITY TO THE PSC. 
The Public Service Commission has no inherent regulatory powers. 
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. PSC, 682 P.2d 858, 859 (Utah 1984). Although it has 
the authority to determine rates Mountain Fuel may charge, it has limited powers 
to impose penalties and other punitive measures. In this case, the PSC has explic-
it statutory authority to determine just and reasonable rates for the utility compa-
nies for which it has statutorily granted jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1 
(1990). But the Commission has partially founded rates on the basis of a reduc-
tion in the allowed rate of return for Mountain Fuel because of its general dissatis-
faction with "the management of the Company's parent, Questar Corporation." 
(R. 1992.) Although the text of the Commission's order characterizes the reduc-
tion as an "adjustment," it is a penalty in every sense of the word. Indeed, the 
Commission's order, in what might be a Freudian slip, addressed the general issue 
of affiliate transactions in terms of "penalties" in the table of contents of its No-
vember 21 Order. (R. I960.)29 
Quite apart from the absence of any finding that the affiliate relationships of 
29This characterization was apparently changed in the text of the order to refer 
to "disallowances," but it seems a fair inference that the mindset of the Commis-
sion was to consider penalizing Mountain Fuel and its parent, Questar Corpora-
tion, for their particular corporate structure and relationship. See also 
R. 2011-13. 
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Mountain Fuel adversely affected the rates charged to its customers (see discussion 
in § C below), the PSC's authority to impose sanctions, penalties and reparations 
on a utility is limited to those provided for by statute. Title 54 of the Utah Code 
provides a variety of methods and actions that the Commission can take, including 
injunction, penalties, fines, and reparations for certain specified situations. E.g., 
Utah Code Ann, §§ 54-7-24 through -29 (1990). There is, however, no statute 
that provides the authority—and the Commission has cited none—for dispensing 
punishment to Mountain Fuel by lowering its authorized rate of return. 
This issue is a matter of law, and the Court must apply a correction-of-
error standard. Kearns-Tribune, 628 P.2d at 859. There is no clearly defined 
statutory grant of authority authorizing the imposition of penalties for a fabric of 
corporate affiliations that the Commission cannot identify as being the cause of 
any rate detriment to Mountain Fuel's customers. To the extent that the Commis-
sion would have found imprudently incurred or other unjustified costs, it has the 
authority to deny cost coverage.30 But is does not have the authority to penal-
ize Mountain Fuel because of the holding-company framework in which the 
30The Commission did adjust cost coverage in this docket from one relatively 
small affiliated-related transaction, the "Brewery property" issue. (R. 1979-81.) 
To the extent that the action taken on this issue is otherwise lawful and sustain-
able, the Commission's cost-recovery-adjustment "remedy" is appropriate because 
it is specifically oriented around the facts and circumstances of identifiable costs 
and rate effects. Further, the PSC appears not to have relied on the Brewery-
property issue in reducing Mountain Fuel's return on equity. 
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Company operates its utility business.31 
The courts have been called upon to review a variety of adjustments and 
penalties related to the rate of return and have produced a spectrum of results as a 
function of the underlying statutory scheme and the precedential state law. There 
have been a number of cases in which a public utility commission has penalized a 
utility for providing substandard service or for exhibiting mismanagement. No 
such factual finding has been made in this case. 
But even in cases of a demonstrated potential negative effect on rates, many 
courts have found that regulators' rate-of-return penalties are not lawful. For 
example, the Texas Court of Appeals has examined this question in a context that 
allows even wider agency discretion and authority to make rate-of-return adjust-
ments than in Utah. In PUC v. Houston Lighting and Power Co., 715 S.W.2d 
98, 103-04 (Tex. App. 1986), the Texas court found that the statutory framework 
provided "no implied authorization . . . for imposing a rate penalty," and: 
[T]he Commission's reduction of a rate of return found by it to be 
reasonable, as a penalty for mismanagement, exceeds the Commis-
sion's authority under [Texas law] and substantially prejudices the 
rights of [the utility] by depriving it of revenues . . . beyond the 
general findings of poor management and unreasonable expenses, 
there is no stated basis for lowering the rate of return . . . . 
In Mountain Fuel's case, the Commission's rate-of-return reduction is an 
3fountain Fuel is a wholly owned subsidiary of Questar Corporation, a 
nonoperating holding company that is a Utah corporation. See R. 2280, Ex. 
MFS-1.6, which gives the Questar Corporation structure. 
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even more obvious excursion outside the boundaries of its legal authority. It 
found no evidence of mismanagement, and it made no finding that rates of Moun-
tain Fuel's customers were adversely affected by what it perceived as an undesir-
able corporate structure.32 (R. 1208-13, 1991-92, 1998-99, 2011-13.) Some 
courts have sustained rate-of-return adjustments on the basis of poor service, but 
the Houston Lighting case distinguishes these from cases like Mountain Fuel's 
because "there are no findings of poor service to ratepayers." 715 S.W.2d at 
103. 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has reached similar conclusions in observ-
ing that "the legislative grant of power to regulate rates will be strictly con-
strued," so that "granting the Commission the authority, in a rate case, to penalize 
the utility for poor service would be an improper extension of the statutory proce-
dure." South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Utility Regulatory Commission, 637 
S.W.2d 649, 653 (Ky. 1982). This Kentucky case is, once again, all the stronger 
relative to the Mountain Fuel situation because it involves a finding of poor ser-
32The Commission's apparent displeasure with the current corporate structure 
(which it approved in 1984) is not reasonable. Private investors in the United 
States are entitled to form corporations and subcorporate structures as they see fit, 
so long as the businesses they operate are willing to meet the standards of the law 
and regulatory constraints as they find them. The Commission's general malaise 
over the choice made by the investors and managers of Questar Corporation 
cannot lawfully be translated into penalties against one of that corporation's sub-
sidiary entities. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. 
PSC9 262 U.S. 276, 288-89 (1923). 
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vice. Even where the utility has been found to provide something less than the 
expected standard of service, the Commission has no power to penalize the com-
pany through rate-of-return adjustments. According to the Kentucky court, 
It seems to us that there is an inherent danger in permitting 
poor service as a basis for setting rates, particularly in the imposition 
of a penalty which results in a reduction of a rate which the Commis-
sion has already found to be fair and reasonable. There are no 
objective, definable standards upon which to base a penalty. It is, at 
best, arbitrary and subjective. Punitive actions should not be subject 
to the possible whims of individuals, including those serving on a 
responsible administrative body. In the present case, it appears that 
the Commission was upset or frustrated by what it deemed Bell's 
failure to improve its service in a previous case. . . . This case is a 
classic example of arbitrary and subjective judgment. 
Id. at 653. The New Mexico Supreme Court reached the same result: 
The [State Corporation Commission] may not demand rate forfeitures 
on service deficiencies from a regulated company for noncompliance 
with its after-the-fact determination of a fair and reasonable rate of 
return. To the contrary, the SCC had a constitutional duty in a rate 
case to adopt rates that "will allow [the utility] to operate successful-
ly, maintain its financial integrity, attract capital, and compensate 
investors for the risk assumed." 
In re: General Telephone Company of the Southwest, 98 N.M. 749, 652 P.2d 
1200, 1207 (1982). On the facts in Mountain Fuel's case, the Utah Commission's 
action is even less justifiable than that of the New Mexico Commission. See also 
General Telephone Co. v. Michigan PSC, 341 Mich. 620, 67 N.W.2d 882 (1954); 
Askew v. Bevis, 37 Fla. Supp. 63, 283 So. 2d 337 (1973). 
The Commission may argue that its action is not a "penalty." The context 
in which it was imposed and the "slip of the pen" in the table of contents of the 
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report and order demonstrate the contrary. The Utah Commission has sought to 
reduce the otherwise just and reasonable compensation to Mountain Fuel's share-
owners because of its general dissatisfaction with the corporate family within 
which Mountain Fuel resides. This is not within the statutory powers granted to 
the Public Service Commission, 
C. THE REDUCTION FROM 12.2% TO 12.1% 
Is NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) requires that agency action based on a 
determination of fact must be "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record." The only foundation for the reduction of the equity 
rate of return from that otherwise found to be just and reasonable is the general 
existence of the Company's current affiliate relationships. The Commission has 
cited no justification for the reduction outside of its general dissatisfaction with the 
corporate structure in which Mountain Fuel operates. There has been no finding 
of Mountain Fuel management imprudence, nor has there been any disallowance 
of costs that would signal malfeasance or mismanagement of the utility operations 
that serve Utah customers. In the course of the proceedings, several witnesses 
addressed the affiliate relations of Mountain Fuel. With one minor exception,33 
the PSC did not adopt any contested, material adjustment to Mountain Fuel's cost 
33
 \n adjustment was made to revalue portions of a multiple-party real estate 
transaction that involved, among others, an affiliate of Mountain Fuel. 
(R. 1979-81.) 
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of service or other ratemaking elements in connection with its affiliate relation-
ships. (See, e.g., R. 1981-82, 2003-05; R. 1979-80, 1999-2001.) 
To the contrary, the Commission found that the Company's long absence 
from the rate-making arena is attributed "in part, to . . . the quality management 
of the Company" (R. 1965) and that "without the benefit of systematic examina-
tion, [ ] Company management has performed very well in most respects." 
(R. 1992.) Although the Commission *take[s] issue with the management of the 
Company's parent, Questar Corporation," there is no finding that Mountain Fuel 
has conducted its affairs in any way that is prejudicial to its carrying out its re-
sponsibilities under Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1 to provide quality natural gas ser-
vice to its Utah customers. The Commission cited, with apparent concurrence, 
the Division's conclusions that "there was not evidence that [affiliate] transaction 
charges were inappropriate" and that "the Company had readily provided request-
ed information about its affiliate transactions." (R. 1980.) 
The Commission's implication that it might organize the Company differ-
ently were it to be managers of the Company is not sufficient reason to penalize 
Mountain Fuel for its place in the corporate organization of Questar Corpora-
tion—an organization which, as the Commission has noted (R. 1992), it approved 
in 1984 in Docket No. 84-057-10.34 Short of a divestiture of the distribution 
340rder issued October 1, 1984. 
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company, there will of necessity be intracorporate transactions between Mountain 
Fuel and the parent and other affiliates. Thus, the Commission's reduction of 
Mountain Fuel's rate of return appears to be based on its general displeasure with 
the organization itself, not on any substantial evidence of an abuse of the corporate 
framework. 
An independent failure of the PSC's rate-of-return penalty is the absolute 
absence of evidence on the quantification of any penalty or adjustment to the rate 
of return. The rate-of-return issue was the subject of extensive evidence—written 
testimony, exhibits, analyses, cross-examination—and not a word was uttered or 
written by any witness on what would be an appropriate measure of a decrement 
to the cost of capital under the PSC's theory of adjustment. 
The Houston Lighting court identified this as a fundamental evidentiary 
problem: 
[W]e observe that no objective standard exists for imposing a 
rate penalty. The Commission concedes that the .5% penalty is 
without support in the record. Beyond the general findings of poor 
management and unreasonable expenses, there is no stated basis for 
lowering the rate of return by .5%, as opposed to .3% or .7% 
715 S.W.2d at 104. A similar situation exists in the Mountain Fuel case—with 
even less justification to impose penalties. Not only was there a complete void of 
evidence linking the ensemble of interaffiliate matters with the rate of return or on 
the quantification of penalty for any PSC-perceived transgressions of Mountain 
Fuel, there was no finding of "poor management and unreasonable expenses." 
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The Texas court's reasons for rejecting penalties for the absence of evidentiary 
support are all the stronger when applied to Mountain Fuel. 
Quite simply, the PSC's rate of return reduction does not satisfy the sub-
stantial-evidence test of § 63-46b-16(4)(g), nor the provisions proscribing arbitrary 
and capricious action in subsection (4)(h)(iv). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mountain Fuel believes the PSC's Novem-
ber 21, 1990, Report and Order does not comply with applicable standards of 
statutory and case law. 
Mountain Fuel seeks relief from this honorable Court as follows: (1) An 
order voiding the PSC's .1% penalty to rate of return and permitting Mountain 
Fuel to file new tariff sheets incorporating a 12.2% equity rate of return. (2) An 
order remanding the issue of the test year to the Commission with instructions to 
permit Mountain Fuel to seek the establishment of rates to be based on the legal 
principles set forth in this Brief—in particular, to permit the Company and other 
parties to submit evidence that it believes will establish as nearly as possible the 
conditions that will exist when the rates are effective. (3) An order requiring the 
PSC, in the absence of the development of a full new record for a future period, 
to allow Mountain Fuel to refile tariffs based on the use of the 1989 year-end rate 
base as the lawful measure of the level of investment entitled to earn a return, as a 
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matter of law on the record established in the proceeding. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY 
Associate General Counsel 
Questar Corporation 
180 East First South Street 
P.O. Box 11150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Counsel for 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 
a Questar Corporation subsidiary 
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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Commission on its own motion and pursuant to Section 
54-4-2 and other applicable statutory provisions determined to 
commence a formal investigation into the reasonableness of the 
rates and charges of Mountain Fuel Supply Company ("Mountain Fuel" 
or "Company"). A notice of prehearing was issued on October 31, 
1989, in which the Commission indicated that- t-vn* «;«„^« ~* /-x — ^ r m ^ ^ 
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of return, (2) affiliate relationships, and (3) cost of service 
were to be addressed. The prehearing was held on November 7, 1989. 
On November 21, 1989, the Commission bench-ordered that a 
1989 historical test year would be employed. In response to a 
Mountain Fuel motion, and following a hearing on the subject, the 
Commission issued a Protective Order on January 31, 1990. 
On January 22, 1990, the Division filed a motion to 
consolidate Dockets 90-057-02 (gas cost proceeding) and 89-057-15 
(general rate case). The motion was granted. 
Mountain Fuel filed an application for a general rate 
increase in the amount of $9,682,000, on March 30, 1990. The 
Commission set the application for prehearing on April 10, 1990, 
and, at the prehearing, determined a schedule for the proceedings. 
This schedule was subsequently amended owing to motions filed by 
the Division of Public Utilities ("Division") and the Committee of 
Consumer Services ("Committee"). In one instance the Committee 
requested clarification about a Commission-directed inquiry of the 
Wexpro Agreement. In another, the Division alleged failure of the 
Company to comply with the timetable for response to discovery 
requests. Sanctions were demanded by the Division. 
On June 27, 1990, the Commission issued a formal order 
denying the Divisionfs request that the Company be sanctioned for 
failure to meet discovery requirements and granting a request of 
the parties that a new schedule be set for the case. 
On August 27, 1990, the Commission sent a memorandum to 
the parties notifying them that the issue of the appropriate test-
year rate base would be the first item addressed in the hearings. 
DOCKET NO. 89-057-15 
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In addition, the Commission directed the parties to prepare a joint 
exhibit of their respective positions on the rate case issues. 
Hearings began on September 5, 1990. The Committee, on 
September 17, 1990, filed a motion to compel the Company to respond 
to a data request and to impose sanctions. The Commission again 
declined to impose sanctions but directed Mountain Fuel to respond 
to the data request. On September 27, 1990, following the con-
clusion of the hearings, the parties filed the required joint 
exhibit. Thereafter, the parties filed briefs explaining and 
defending their respective positions. 
II, DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO 
DETERMINATION OF REVENUE REQUIREMENT 
Early in this docket formulation of the test period 
emerged as a key issue. We had ordered the use of a 1989 historic 
test year after having considered the parties1 arguments, pro and 
con. Our principal reason for this choice was to avoid bogging 
down in debates about the adequacy of future test year forecasting 
techniques at the very time we were endeavoring to learn the actual 
circumstances of a utility we had not thoroughly examined for some 
years. 
The last Mountain Fuel rate case was concluded in 1985. 
Since then, several rate decreases have occurred as a result of 
decreases in gas costs. In addition, the Company found no reason 
to seek rate relief. We attribute this, in part, to be a result of 
the quality management of the Company. Our analysis of the princi-
pal armmonf -5« «^*T»~— -* - ~ * • 
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inflation, convinced us that it was not persuasive at this time. 
Implicitly, therefore, we did not recognize the need for attrition 
adjustments. 
TJius, use of a historic test year in this proceeding is 
important in part because of the unusually and undesirably long 
time that has passed since our last rate case examination of this 
utility. Actual, historical data has the advantages of simplicity 
and accountability. In general, such data can be used for rate 
case analysis, thereby minimizing the use of forecasted data 
derived by technical and debatable methods. 
Prior to this rate case we adopted a rule prescribing 
test year annualization guidelines. It did not contemplate 
historic test years and, as the evidence on this record shows, is 
not readily applicable to them. A future test year embodies 
forecasted revenues, expenses, and investment; that is, forecasts 
of changes in both prices and quantities of inputs and outputs. 
The annualization rule attempts to confine ad hoc test year adjust-
ments to those that are not linked, logically and economically, 
with other revenues, expenses, or investments; those, in the words 
of the rule, where interdependencies are minimal. This generally 
means that price, as distinct from volume or quantity, changes may 
be acceptable. An increase in the price of postage stamps occur-
ring during the test year is one example: in the short term, it 
may affect nothing else, such as the volume of mailings. However, 
the price increase is beyond managements control, and failure to 
account for it may unfairly decrease the opportunity to earn a fair 
return. Yet, revenues, expenses, and investments must be matched 
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the underlying economic relationships between inputs and outputs,, 
One ad hoc change which affects other thiiiu'i without compensate ng 
a d ) uj;i i iiM- 1 * i' i i 111 I in * c e s s d i y 11< 11111 M I I I 111 iter est of 
proper matching, it should be done as little .is possible. 
Post-test-year "^'istments are not tin 
annua] i zation g uidelines. The Company, and to a lirar* *-- <.-i <*. •  
Division, attempted apply them, to such adjustments- • -i 
docket, none/the 1 nsr\, Wt , i* 11• ! " ' •', I iMjausp 111,!1 jr 
between I ho te^t year anJ i proposed ijirijle Mom ar/asu- . ie 
more likely it will necessil <it « ..llni deliberate chanqp^ if test' 
y f M i r i ' V ' P m i P ' ' I « " I ' I C I L H ' , lillml i n" PF.ti l i t" n t M I I i 
Even more i m p o r t a n t l y , wi lu I lie p a s s a g e ol t ime p r u d e n t management 
w i l l have a d a p t e d o p e r a t i o n s t o any stioh ohanqe ir u -
i <ji mi i in in i i i t \ i 1 1 in in in h u m in i i i f in i in 11 II mi i n 1 1 1 1 1 in in 1 1 1 1 s r e c o r d . 
The a c c o u n t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n 11 m i - sen ted in t h i s docket -
g e n e r a l l y d o e s iinf p e r m i t u i t n li tw i m 1 nr • iir<=s <iln t 1 11> - < i l , •, 
e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n r i f i . ^ IMW ill in l a r n z e s , i n r e s t : m i n i m i z -
i n g f a s h i o n , p r o d u c t - - - i n o r d e r t o d e l i v e r i t s s e r v i c e s , 
We do i lo t knuw, J.OJC nil pi in loiil in iiriaqoiitoiil i iilllill illllii iiiiiii 
r e a c t i oi i t n o r in ar . i p a t i o r t a chanqe in t h e p r i c e of a key 
i n p u t such & • U-v-r wage r a t e s , C e r t a i n l y 1 h p r e i s no j u s t i f i c a -
t i o n J f. n i i i in •> •- ^ . i in II II in in 1 I  111' in 11 i it I ' mi 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 . , f 1 1 1 1 1
 ( - 1 1 (- . -,, | i 111 | 111 ri i s 
what i t means t o say that; a hit t ire p r n e l e v e l change has minimal 
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s . 
• I ' " inn i Il III p«M mi i t. iint • < :)f • p e r i o d a d j u s t m e n t s i s 
a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y I i u p s e t t h e t e s t - y e a r match < : >f r e v e n u e s , . , -
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may impose a risk of under-recovery* When the period between rate 
cases is short this risk is lessened, as is the potential for 
mismatch when, as is the case here, accounting data is used to 
approximate complex economic interrelationships. But when this 
period is as long as it has been, out-of-period adjustments should 
be based upon an economic model of the firm. Without the under-
standing of economic relationships such a model provides, the use 
of accounting data will tend to support selective adjustments to 
the test year that are one-sided, and generally proposed by those 
having information and expertise. This will lead to an undesirable 
mismatch of investment, revenue, and expenses, generally increasing 
revenue requirement. Selective adjustments, in short, may yield a 
less representative test period for ratemaking purposes than no 
adjustments at all. 
The purpose of a test year, or test period, is to provide 
revenue, expense, and investment information that reasonably 
approximates circumstances expected during the period rates will be 
in effect. The rates we set in this docket will be in effect in 
1991. Are post-test-period adjustments required to approximate 
future circumstances? The Company, and in part the Division, say 
yes; the Committee, no. The Company argued that post-test-year 
adjustments must be made; the Division, that such adjustments can, 
with difficulty, be made; and the Committee, that such adjustments 
create more problems than they solve. According to the Division, 
the best solution is to move the test period forward in time, 
nearer to the period rates will be in effect. This cannot be done 
in this docket. First, we have ordered a 1989 test year, parties 
X \J -L 
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a p o s i t i o n t o p r e s e n t a c a s e based urn ill 
T h e r e
 d r e t h r e e p t i o n s . tit I we c a n r e o p e n t h p rei nril 
and r e d o t h e c a s e b a s e d ,, a t e s t p e r i o d n e a r e r i n t i m e , I h i s i s 
c o m p l e t e l y i m p r a c t i c a l and we r e j e c t l*. i:'econ«I, u*j rat1 p e r u u t 
s e l e c t ,"M,F r J I pf-rii 1 " I I1 • .1 nui ,1 . lmi«3i-lr - n i "?.p • nil t i. | l M 
g u i d e l i n e s c o n t a i n e d J I an i n a p p l i c a b l e r u l e , For r e a s o n s 
d i s c u s s e d a t l e n g t h a b o v e , we a l s o r e j e c t t h i s a p p r o a c h , T h i r d wr-
C d i i i " J i i i y in Mi I 111 I I I I 1 II I hi P l i 1 Ii |< i •«• • | i i 1 tin in I t m i n | i l l \\tii nnl lul ) i i i s t m e n t s 
o n l y . Me f i n d t h a t t h i s i s l h e most p r a c t i c a l and l e a s t complex 
a l t e r n a t i ve i i|.mn i s s u a n c p nt t h i s nnlp1 t he Company o r a11y o t h e r 
pari1) mi i i iniiiieii mi (H K« i y i n > i i .iiiiw!,1 i.n< IM ic, in pet i t i n inr a 
c h a n g e i n r a t e s s h o u l d i p a r t y c l a i m a change i s n e c e s s a r y . 
Confus ion annul u n n e c e s s a r y work h i v e l e s n l t o d b e c a u s e lhe 
Commission diill IIII I i l ec ide i l l nt t h e t e s t - y e a r i s s u e s .il f lie o u t s e t : 
of t h i s d o c k e t , In f u t u r e p r o c e e d i n g s , t h p Commission w i l l d e c i d e 
i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g t e s t ,i in „ i ill" m i» , ni ul pm i nil adjiistnieiin s, 
and r e l a t e d m a t t e r s , p r i n i t o I lie onset nl h e a r i n g s and based on 
t h e t h e n e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s ml t h e u t i l i t y and Lhe economy i n 
which mi I mi i i»I M »i if i I in 11 • ' • 
A v e r a q e - o f - Y e a r Versus End-of-Year Adjustments 
"1. Aver age Rate Base 
C e r t a i n a n n u a l i z a t i o n a d j u s t m e n t s depend on t h e choice? of 
a v e r a g e o r y e a r - e n d r a t e b a s e . The Lump,my m | i i r i | t ha i il 
1 * i s t o i i c f: e s t: j e a r , a n e n d - o f - y e a r r a t i b a s e n i o i e a c c u r a t e l y 
r e f l e c t s c o n d i t i ons e x p e c t e d when new r a t e j w i l l b e i n e f f e c t tlm^ , 
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base is six months nearer in time. The Division agreed, though 
under questioning from the Commission, its witness, citing the 
complexity of adjustments to test-year revenues and expenses 
necessitated by end-of-year rate base, stated a preference for 
using average-of-year rate base. The Committee recommended use of 
average-of-year rate base based upon consistency with prior 
Commission rulings and more accurate matching of known test-year 
investment, revenues, and expenses. According to the Committee, 
end-of-year rate base, a single point in time, requires that 
numerous complicated adjustments be made to revenues and expenses 
to restore a proper matching. 
The Commission finds an average rate base appropriate for 
the following reasons. First, the Commission has relied on average 
rate base in recent U S WEST Communications and Utah Power and 
Light dockets. The present docket has produced no compelling 
reason to depart from that practice. Second, an average-of-year 
rate base provides an appropriate basis for matching the annual 
flows of revenues and expenses to the average annual stock of plant 
and equipment employed by the utility and to the manner in which 
the utility has been operated. An end-of-year rate base is a mere 
snapshot, a potentially misleading picture of rate base at one 
point in time. Third, an end-of-year rate base requires that 
substantial, difficult adjustments, fraught with policy implica-
tions, be made to revenues and expenses. Because the Company's 
application reflects end-of-year rate base, our acceptance of the 
^ V JL </ i 
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Committee's recommendations for average-of -year rate base decreases 
Id t«J h cl SO 
2. End of-Year Depreciation 
. The i. ompany proposed i ncrease 1989 depreciation. 
expense l"u reflect end-of-year rate base. Our decision " employ 
average-(if-yedx . * i 
adjustment raoo^ *e find that no expense adjustment necess? 
.3. GS Customs 
\ .• Company •* *. * < * * * -J i T ^  base 
figures, but 1 -^ i inualize either the number 3 
-ie 
product otal customer <-> f ^ ~ customer *-.--?i. : -,, ume 
delivered r ^  - °ra^^d jLej.dLivejL^  
n recommended that numbei ustomers 
shoul " V.- annualized t match /-* ! -- - c- t a1 *a 
usage <-•*- ~ustome: ias der 1 
fcecaus ^t-if i • it e- r*e ?* vo 
heating seasc*... Th* ivision annualization adjustment would 
increase reveriu 
TbA Company countered that if the Divi sion• s annual i za-
tion of I' :. number of customers was adopted, :i •• t ^ nld be necessary 
to annua It P t ln> rust OIIIMI IPIIHI w h :I cl i bhe 2 smpa <* *<= ^ ontinu-
The dollar value of this adjustment is the change in rate 
base our decision requires. Likewise., our following revenue and 
expense decisions are expressed as the dollar adjustments required. 
None of the adjustments are stated in revenue requirement terms 
U n t i l s n w m ^ r i ? o r l a • 
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ing the declining trend exhibited over the last decade. The 
combined effect of the annualization of the number of customers and 
the usage per customer would be a decrease in revenue of $1,057,000 
according to the Company. 
The Committee took the position that the average test 
year approach produces the desired matching of investment, reve-
nues, and expenses and therefore recommended against both adjust-
ments. 
The Commission, having adopted the average test year 
approach, finds the Committee's position appropriate, and rejects 
both adjustments. 
B. Post-Test Period Adjustments 
Eight post-test-year adjustments were proposed, all but 
one of them by the Company. Two of these, the ffET-2ff and "customer 
X" adjustments, though partially offsetting, would increase reve-
nues. Six of them would increase expenses: 1990 labor adjustment, 
pension plan adjustment, Questar Service 1990 adjustment, produc-
tion-related depreciation, FICA tax, and gross receipts tax. The 
effect of accepting them all would be a small increase in test 
period revenues and a much larger increase in test period expenses. 
With one minor exception the Committee recommended rejecting the 
adjustments. 
The Division proposed and supported one revenue adjust-
ment and recommended rejecting the one proposed by the Company. 
The six expense adjustments were proposed by the Company. The 
Division recommended rejecting two of them and supported, but 
^ l e n n f o ^ 4-Vio H n l l a r a m n n n f e o-F *hVio r o m a i n i nrr f n n r Wo w i 1 1 nn+-
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r e p e a t h e r e t h e d e t a i l s nf iii.il " • l o s i t i ' i n s any f u r t h e r h-tvin-f 
pi i\v 11 mis J y diM uissi'd inn p i c i l inn IIII pn",t - t e s t - y e a r a d j u s t m e n t s 
u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s docke t For t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d in 
t h a t d i s c u s s i o n *-- • ;;1 t h a t t h e a d j u s t m e n t s mus t b e r e j e c t e d . 
The i iin. i iiJt.it i e v e n u e s i jom d e t t . r r e d main e x t e n -
s i o n p a y m e n t s made by a c u s t o m e r added t o i t s s y s t e m in ii'i n The 
paymen t s a r e pin I" nil n I pip yn.ii inn i HI 1 in mprniy niiui i lit ,n i iiiiipd 
that these deterred p a r e n t s die .n known and measurable benefit to 
the customers, have nn interdependency and should not be elimi-
nated i.!.' i,:1 „ i'-inn I, ii|, I'hn . oiiiin J I ten
 t however, 
argued that such revenues should not be considered since they occur 
bey on i the test year and recommended ^ -
reve • mi ssi 01 i agrees wi ne Committee and ti.^s that 
the Company's Utah non-gas revenues should be decreased by 
$312 #000. 
-^ Test Period Adjustments 
I . A d j u s t lie i I in i miiM'1 I iiii Ht.'Vti'iiiit11! 
The Company proposes adjustments : . ; he ^ver -* 
received from industrial customers- - * .-....*.; 
r a t e s c h e d i 11i • . • 11 ":i r 11• j i; \ 111 1
 0 ^  & m The. 
remainder wete post-test, j The Compai i ^.^ vis, on 









 M M ) - hir/tF, WII - I - A 1,1 I, which in- period annualL-
z a t i o n a d j u s t m e n t s can be c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from p o s t - t e s t y e a r 
; ,,JS
 - T h e r e f o r e , t h e Commission - . innualizati on. 
""
I|,;|
 > , , s l 'i^"ift * n - -•• i.t;^i)l iiLilo, rind wi . permit $72 ,000 i n c r e a s e in 
revenniacs _ 
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2. Promotional Advertising 
The Company testified that $309,000 in test-year pro-
motional advertising expense should be recovered in rates because, 
it was asserted, the advertising had resulted in increased revenues 
well in excess of the expense. In the Company's view, this was a 
ratepayer benefit. The Division and the Committee both argued that 
the Company had asserted but failed to demonstrate a causal connec-
tion between promotional advertising and additional revenues, and 
in no other way had suggested a benefit sufficient to permit 
recovery of the expenses in rates. The Commission notes that R750-
406-1 prohibits recovery of promotional advertising expenses from 
ratepayers, unless, under subsection C of that rule, it finds such 
advertising to be in the public interest. In this instance, the 
Company has sought to equate what it characterizes as the ratepayer 
benefit of speculative increased revenues with the public interest. 
This is not sufficient. 
The Commission finds that the Company has failed to 
demonstrate that its promotional advertising is in the public 
interest sufficiently to qualify for a subsection C exemption from 
the R750-406 prohibition and will therefore reduce the Company's 
expenses by $309,000. 
We further find that the Company did not demonstrate that 
its promotional advertising produced the additional revenues it 
alleged. Disallowance of these expenses, therefore, necessitates 
no change in revenues. 
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Mounta i r F *• . -ought .in ad Hist merit iiiiiii I In amour* ': 
$1,0?7,00C orinq ** " u i M./PIF I IHI I I I I r u s t * n^at -Mini J 
l e v e l s . The Compan/ Argued I tn" ' 111 s i d j u s t m e n t i s known and 
m e a s u r a b l e , c l e a r l y meet« *«"»ia 1 i z a t ion c r i t e r i a ami i s n e c e s s a r y 
tin iii rur i t i ; iy iiiMi'i iei r i MIL. IJ . pfu IIMI ului i 11 • f i no pei lod new 
r a t e s ^ i 11 be in e f l e c t . The D i v i s i o n a g r e e d w i t h t h i s 
a d j u s t m e n t While not opposed t o H I P a d i u s t m e n t ner ;P \\\H 
Coinmir MMJ i;ei. 11 in in i-» r i« IHI I I II III I ho aci j u s tmeu t s h o u l d be $799,001), i he 
Company a r g u e d t h a t t h e Committee f a i l e d M» c o n s i d e r t h e ef•ect 
a n n u a l i z i n g wages t n December l e v e l s Ii i1. mi HICMI 1 IIIIIIP \\V\ nui i \ I I 
pay , inn s t i x K fiii-wi bwnul. i t s , among o t h e i t h i n g s , The Commission 
f inds t h a t t h i s Company-proposed adjustment i s appropriate and that 
£..j- r e s u l t s in <t * 
4. Questar Corporation/Massachusetts Formula 
1 * : 1 corpora4"** ^ ^^fs 
to Questa orporat:oi subsidiaries - three-fa^- *r 
"Massachusetts formula* assign* 
recommended tha • -TMC * Massachusse^t"^ 
formu:a ablished by *•- £LR^ m ui 
e gas ^oct^-c- f . evenue^ »r x* ^ unTnin 
Fuel and other subsidiai - * , r*i mating a durl ^  at;— *-
from the pass-throuah 
Z9I was ,,:i case speciiiu, DU; -*-S?- -pp *<i£ e gener.%. , The 
Committee recommended use „i a general dixuudtiun 
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prevent general corporate overhead costs from being overallocated 
to the Company. The Commission finds that the gross revenues 
formula over-allocates general corporate costs to the Company, that 
the net revenue formula is a better means of allocating such costs, 
and, accordingly, will adopt the Division's position, resulting in 
a $575,000 decrease in expenses. 
5. Questar Services 1989 True-Up 
Mountain Fuel sought an adjustment of $40,000 to reflect 
the January, 1990 adjustment of test-year Questar Service Corpora-
tion charges. The Company argued that the adjustment is necessary 
to correct a mistake in the December, 1989 billing. The Division 
did not oppose the adjustment. The Committee argued that the 
adjustment should be treated consistently with past January 
true-ups for Mountain Fuel and disallowed. The Commission finds 
the adjustment acceptable and will allow the $40,000 increase in 
expenses• 
6. Interest Synchronization 
The Committee proposed an interest synchronization 
adjustment to provide equal treatment to customers of Option 1 and 
Option 2 utilities. The Committee alleged that failure to adopt 
the adjustment for Option 1 utilities (such as Mountain Fuel) would 
result in a higher revenue requirement for the Company and rate 
discrimination against Option 1 ratepayers. 
The Company argued that it will violate federal law if it 
applies interest synchronization and will thereby risk tax penal-
ties. In addition, the ratepayers will risk havina the amount of „
 r — 
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tin- inr f -o i l i ' i l I IL i n f i l l . . adtknl In i.Hi ih is* llic IJ iv i s t on l i k e -
w i s e r e j e c t e d t h e a d o p t i o n of t.he i n t e r e s t s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n HIPt hod 
a r g u i n g t h a t 11- ippl i e s only l»> f r > I'HIII' "« - t " I ' M ' i . 'miujiu. ; 
w h i l e Mount..iin hue I i s «i l f > ( l | | l | company Adopt J on ot t he a d j u s t -
ment would p e n a l i z e t h e Company at' il he S.HIIM ('imp i t s r evenue 
rpcj'i i • flkTTi<: nl" i ' I » r i-Jy ' • " ' "I • "> " c • | \ I " i i l| 11 ', 
The Commission finds that the interest synchronization 
method proposed * be ommittee * * applicable to Mountain 
a * die p n , J aajusrme, , 
7• South Georgia Amortization 
Mi HI in i! .i  mi in  hue I p r o p o s e d t o u s e t h e S o u t h G e o r g i a m e t h o d t o 
reflect flow-back of underdeferred tax expenses. The Company 
argue11 that M "".rtl .1 h". i it t,i,il * i " I l |v i . ^n I al i mil id 
results in tin.1 .lowest impact on rates, m UP Division agreed that 
this method is appropriate .mini testified that the Company coin Id 
l o s e -in S 4 h I 111 I in 11 HI in mi in 111 n i •, 1 m o 111 1 i i II i« II i i j. i il I i s n u ' t a I 11 >w i • n I 11 \ 
use this method Phe i?ommittec testified that * he South Georgia 
adjustment increases revenue requirement, is not* raqu i ir i m If,- mi in 
Int enia 1 Rfvf"""" ' >*\<> «,,« ? , >> ,i 'h"il v.ed 1,,,* 1 LRC lor 
certain utilities, and should bp rejected because t'hp Company lias 
not demonstrated that j,f is required, 
Tl.r Conmisb 11 i i n 1 1 i Ii the South Georgia method i s 
appropriate and will allow the resulting $921f000 increase in 
expenses. 
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8. Environmental Clean-Up 
The Company sought to include in this case certain 
environmental cleanup expenses incurred at its Salt Lake North 
Operation Center. The Company argued that such cleanup expenses 
are appropriately recovered in rates because they are normal, 
ongoing expenses of the Company. The Division agreed with the 
position of the Company. The Committee, however, argued that such 
costs are extraordinary, non-recurring and not a normal part of 
utility operations. The Committee pointed out that these cleanup 
costs relate to contamination caused from 1908 to 1929 by Utah Gas 
& Coke Company's coal gasification activities, and, therefore, 
relate to prior service periods and prior customers. The Committee 
suggested that to allow such costs today would be a violation of 
the rule against retroactive ratemaking. 
In our Order in Case No. 84-057-07, we said that the 
failure of the Company to recover certain expenses in the cost of 
service constitutes a risk of conducting utility business for which 
the utility is compensated when a rate of return is established for 
invested capital. However, we are cognizant of the fact that this 
cleanup was necessitated by government regulation enacted long 
after the events causing the contamination. We consider that such 
burdens may be placed upon the Company by government's changing 
environmental views from time to time and believe that in this 
instance it is an unavoidable expense for an energy utility. 
Therefore, the recommendation of the Committee to disallow these 
expenses is rejected.. 
"^  n <* nv 
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9. Brewery Property 
The Division proposed in unite base find depreciation 
e L'ppnsi'1 m l ] u s t liienit fnn t l i i i l ' (n nt i on mf iiiiii n i | i n r p i p i e c e I 
property, caller! the Brewery property, wlnili w.i'j in excess nf- u 
the Division testified was Its fair ami reasonable value. The 
I I m i l l l I I I H P r i H J ( ) f l i I I II I ' l l I l i t " II I II II II I H I i I ' l l 1 I | ) I V l»i I 111 I l l ' i t IIIIINMflt 
r e f l e c t an average ra the i than year-end r a t e base , 
11 in Company obta ined t h i s p roper ty through an exchange of 
mi jit: I"ie i" proport]*'!" i n n i k iin| i uniont.i i loi|m» il iiinii .ill i l l i a l e i nmpiiriy, 
I n t e r s t a t e Land Corporat ion (" ILC" | Mountain Fi,ie J rece ived the 
Brewery p r o p e r t y alonq with .in garage f ae i l I t \ r which h.id been 
c o n s t r u c t e d h^  r 'LLC to r the Company, IllliiC rece ived f i v e p i e c e s of 
p r o p e r t y which were e i t h e r owned or purchased by Mountain F'ue I 
The Company proposed t in t The I ninsnct' inn I e #•:• » ni h i n t e "Il I j n ns l i d e r -
j iiy Hie land p r i c e d id market va lue and I he garage and r e l a t e d 
f a c i l i t i e s at, d e p r e c i a t e d book va lue , The Company argued that, the 
1 -it f e i I,I M i i n ' J i II in 11 i in i mi in I II i in II II mi n p e i i 1 11 | H I (n i e 111 II I n 1 m i I 
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v a l u a t i o n of the Brewer,, pi npr r t y wa»" tun I i in i (II i iiilnh till ml nl I In 
i niiipain; " s tiiinnysidn p r o p e r t y , tinman .in exchange for t he Breweiy 
p r o p e r t y , w i ; too low,, AMttinJnij In Ilium, t he key to the exchange 
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length. The Division offered an adjustment that valued the trans-
action at the average of the original appraisals performed by the 
Company and ILC. It further justified the Brewery property and 
improvements average appraisal by calculating the depreciated book 
value of this asset transferred from the affiliate to the utility 
and arriving at essentially the same value. 
The Commission is of the view that transactions involving 
affiliates place ratepayers at a disadvantage that can never be 
entirely controlled or offset. For that reason it is generally 
appropriate to allow transfers of property from affiliates to the 
utility at the lesser of book or market and transfers going the 
other way at the greater of book or market. We find that Mountain 
Fuel's property transferred to an affiliate should be valued at the 
greater of market or book, while that transferred from an affiliate 
to Mountain Fuel should be valued at the lesser of market or book. 
We further find reasonable the Company's proposed valuation of the 
Sunnyside property on the basis of 30 condominium units per acre. 
Therefore we will accept the Division's adjustment as modified by 
the Sunnyside changes. These decisions result in two adjustments, 
a decrease in depreciation expenses of $23,000 and a decrease in 
rate base of $923,000. We would note that if the Company had 
sought Commission approval of these affiliate transactions at the 
time they took place, which approval is required under our 1984 
Order approving the reorganization of Questar Corporation, Docket 
No. 84-057-10, it would have been in a better position to justify 
its actions and/or provide additional data where its position was 
inadequately supported. 
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the disallowance recommended by the Committee. We also find that 
the burden to justify affiliate transactions is, and must always 
be# the utility's. 
D. Cash Working Capital 
1. Lead/Lag Study Results 
The basis of the cash working capital requirement is the 
Company's lead/lag study. The study contains ten broad categories 
of revenues and expenses, and each category is associated with 
lead/lag day. The study calculates a net composite lead/lag day as 
an average of the individual lead/lag days weighted by the dollar 
amount in each respective category. An average daily cash working 
capital requirement is obtained as the product of the net composite 
lead/lag day and cost-of-service, divided by 365 days. There are 
two disputed issues concerning the lead/lag study. The first is 
the revenue lag day associated with delinquent accounts and the 
second is the expense lead day associated with income tax payments. 
a. Delinquent Accounts 
The Company testified that the delinquent account balance 
was an average for the entire year and therefore a revenue lag of 
365 days should be employed. The Division took issue with the 
Company's use of a 365 revenue lag day. The Division testified 
that due to the lack of quantifiable information caused by the 
Company's exclusion of delinquent accounts from its statistical 
sampling method, it is appropriate to use a revenue lag day deter-
mined as an average of the number of days the accounts were delin-
nn«* or 
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The Committee recommended that delinquent accounts be 
removed from the lead/lag study. The Committee argued that 
Mountain Fuelfs proposal is inconsistent with the treatment re-
quested in its recent Wyoming rate case. In addition, the proposal 
is deficient in that it fails to accurately measure the impact of 
delinquent accounts by overlooking offsets such as the customer-
contributed capital available from the accumulated provision for 
uncollectible accounts. 
The Commission finds that the analyses of this issue by 
the Company and the Committee are not satisfactory and that the 
proposal of the Division is the most reasonable. Therefore a 
revenue lag of 125.39 days associated with delinquent accounts 
should be applied in this case. 
b. Income Tax Payments 
Mountain Fuel proposed an expense lead day associated 
with income tax payments, computed from actual 1989 historic test 
year payments. The Division based its factor on statutory due 
dates and a June 30th test year mid-point. According to the 
Division, the expense lead day associated with income tax expenses 
should not be based on actual results which are the product of 
Company estimates but should be based on a fixed payment schedule 
throughout the year. The Division argued that the Companyfs 
estimates unnecessarily increase cash working capital. The 
Committee supported the Divisionfs proposal. The Commission finds, 
consistent with its decisions in prior cases, that it is appro-
priate to use statutory due dates to determine the expense lead day 
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and therefore an expense lead of 59.32 days should be applied in 
this case. 
c. Adjusted Lead/Lag Study Results 
The Company adjusted its lead/lag study to incorporate 
Commission findings concerning revenue and expense adjustments and 
findings with respect to the lead/lag days associated with delin-
quent accounts and income tax payments. The Commission finds 
reasonable the adjusted lead/lag study which results in a cash 
working capital requirement of $2,824,000. 
2. Compensating Balances 
The Company proposed to include in cash working capital 
the cash balances required to maintain lines of short-term credit 
and cash funds for other administrative purposes. The Company 
argued that these cash balances are assets necessary to the opera-
tion of the Company and therefore a return on such balances should 
be allowed. The Division argued that there should be no addition 
to rate base for compensating balances because investors know that 
funds are required for administrative purposes and their return on 
equity expectations already reflect this understanding. The 
Committee agreed with the Division that compensating cash balances 
should not be allowed as a component of cash working capital. The 
Commission finds, consistent with its decisions in prior cases, 
that it is not appropriate to include compensating cash balances in 
the determination of cash working capital and therefore rejects the 
Company's proposal. 
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3. Require Payment in 23 Days 
The Division proposed to reduce the Company's cash 
working capital requirement as a result of its proposal to modify 
the Company's billing practices by requiring customer payment 
within 23 days after the billing date. According to the Division 
this reduction in payment period would produce an annual savings in 
revenue requirement. The Company argued that the proposed adjust-
ment is not known and measurable and the modification to its 
billing practices would require the addition of employees and 
equipment, and would not be favorably perceived by its customers. 
The Committee testified that the Divisionfs proposal would be 
appropriate only if the 23-day period was fully reflected through-
out the determination of cash working capital. The Commission 
finds that the proposal is insufficiently developed in this case 
and will not adopt it at this time. We may revisit this issue 
after the task force currently addressing these issues submits its 
report. 
E. Rate of Return 
1. Rate of Return on Equity 
The position the Company took in this docket is that a 
return on common equity above 13 percent is required by investors. 
This was the conclusion of its witness, Dr. Williamson, who ana-
lyzed a sample of comparable companies primarily by application of 
a discounted cash flow (DCF) model to a sample of representative 
gas distribution utilities. He supported this analysis with 
capital asset pricing model and risk premium tests, and a study of 
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Williamson's sample consisted of eight companies which he deter-
mined had operational and risk characteristics similar to the 
Company's. Size, service territory degree-days, proportion of 
distribution operations, and availability of information were the 
factors used to select the sample. To estimate expected growth, a 
key component of the DCF analysis, Dr. Williamson relied on securi-
ty analysts' estimates of earnings growth rates. Forecasted 
growth, added to estimated dividend yield, which he based on next 
year's dividend, and applied to the sample companies, then checked 
by the Hope and Bluefield and risk premium analyses, yielded the 
recommendation. In prefiled testimony, Dr. Williamson's estimate 
of the required return was 13.5 percent. At hearing's end, the 
Company advocated a return above 13 percent. 
Division witness Eatmon recommended a 12.0 percent 
required return on equity. Mr. Eatmon relied on the DCF method, 
applying it to several different samples of comparable companies. 
His estimate of the DCF growth component was based on forecasts of 
earnings and dividend growth rates, equally weighted. For dividend 
yield, he selected 12-month average stock prices, after reviewing 
market prices for periods of one, three, six, and twelve months, 
and employed an estimate of the next period's expected annual 
dividend. Application of the DCF model to the comparable companies 
resulted in an 11.6 to 12.4 percent range of reasonable estimates 
of investor required returns. Mr. Eatmon recommended 12.0 percent. 
The Committee and Nucor Steel jointly sponsored the 
testimony of Dr. Marcus on these issues. Dr. Marcus's DCF analysis 
of comparable companies led to his recommendation of 12.2 percent 
as t h p nnQ't- o*P o r n n f v ranifal 
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These witnesses were in agreement that Mountain Fuel 
Supply's actual capital structure should be used in this proceed-
ing. Though the Company is a subsidiary of a holding company, each 
testified that the actual capital structure could be measured in an 
acceptable manner and would be appropriate to derive the overall 
cost of capital. 
We can only determine the cost of capital indirectly, by 
assessing expert opinion about the rate of return investors can be 
expected to require if they are to purchase equity shares. This 
required market rate of return is hypothetical and is estimable 
only through a conscientious, fair-minded exercise of judgment. 
Our decisions must afford the utility the opportunity to 
earn a fair rate of return. This is a return which will maintain 
the utility1s credit standing and allow it to attract additional 
capital, thus assuring its financial integrity. Also, this return 
would allow it to achieve earnings comparable to companies of 
similar risk. Such standards guide our decisions and are well 
known* At the heart of our considerations, however, is the pre-
sumption of an efficient, effective management. 
The rate of return must not be set so high as to exploit 
consumers, however. Thus, the concept of a fair rate of return 
suggests a range or a zone of reasonableness. A return permitted 
within this range will be just and reasonable; earnings within the 
range will not be insufficient for the Company or harmful to 
consumers. We must balance the interests of owners and customers. 
On this record* expert witness testimony places the fair 
rate of return at 12.0, 12.2, or 13.5 percent, estimates drawn from 
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somewhat broader. One hundred-fifty basis points separate the 
three point estimates. Each basis point amounts to $23,000 of 
revenue requirement. 
The evidence shows, and the parties themselves agree, 
that each witness testified credibly. Widely accepted techniques, 
though primarily the DCF model, frame their analyses. 
The principal value of the DCF or other models presented 
on the record is the delimitation and organization of relevant 
information. Sophisticated extension and elaboration of the models 
is of doubtful value since it can only obscure the subjectivity, 
the careful Commission judgment, that is the deciding factor. In 
this case, the presentation of the models has been straightforward, 
without suggestion of an unrealistic precision. 
Our orders in recent rate cases reveal growing reliance 
on the DCF method. It is acceptable because it is understandable, 
its basis in theory reasonable, its components estimable in our 
proceedings, and perhaps above all, its results reliable under a 
variety of circumstances. The same cannot be said of the capital 
asset pricing model, which in our proceedings seems immersed in 
doubt. The technique is of questionable reliability and more often 
than not has been employed to support a rate of return recommenda-
tion much higher than indicated by DCF results. As with the risk 
premium approach, measuring the components is problematical. While 
the DCF method is not free of problems, including circularity— 
regulation authorizes earnings, which influence dividends per 
share, from which yield is determined and the growth rate is 
estimated, all then resulting in calculated equity cost—the 
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view typically fall within a narrow range and we have been able to 
assess their disagreements. We therefore reaffirm a previously 
stated determination to place little reliance on other methods. 
(See Report and Order, Docket Number 88-049-07, October 18, 1989, 
pp. 65-67.) 
Our first concern is the estimation by the witnesses of 
the DCF variables and the samples of comparable firms to which the 
method is applied. Secondly, we will consider other influential 
factors. 
The discounted cash flow method estimates the investor!s 
capitalization or discount rate, the cost of capital, as the sum of 
the dividend yield and the expected dividend growth rate. Current 
dividend per share is divided by current market price to obtain 
dividend yield. There is some disagreement concerning the proper 
dividend and price to use, but the more significant disputes arise 
over the estimation of the dividend growth rate. 
In theory, the DCF model requires a dividend yield 
calculated for the point in time that cost of capital is deter-
mined, that is, current annual dividend divided by current market 
price. Short-term fluctuations in market price can affect the cost 
of capital determination unduly, however, so each witness used a 
price averaged over a period of time determined to be representa-
tive. The dividend used was adjusted to reflect the next period's 
expected annual dividend by each witness, but the Committee and the 
Division witnesses both criticized Dr. Williamson's next period 
yield adjustment as unsupportably high. 
The estimation of a dividend growth rate is problematical 
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used earnings growth rate forecasts as the basis for his dividend 
growth rate estimate. He described DCF as working best "when both 
earnings and dividends are in a smooth upward trend and when 
forecasts of growth are consistent," and asserted this was true for 
his sample of eight companies. Both Committee and Division wit-
nesses criticized his approach. Dr. Marcus analyzed historic 
growth patterns, growth in retained earnings, and reviewed 
analysts' opinions in his effort to estimate expected dividend 
growth rates. He asserted that Dr. Williamson had been unduly 
influenced by analysts1 opinions and had not analyzed historic 
growth behavior. Moreover, two firms in the Williamson sample of 
eight show unrealistically high growth rates, 22 percent for one 
and 15 percent for the other. Division witness Eatmon estimated a 
dividend growth rate based on both earnings and dividend growth 
forecasts. He testified that the Company used unrealistic earnings 
growth projections as the basis for its DCF dividend growth rate. 
Both Division and Committee witnesses recommended rejecting this 
aspect of Williamson's DCF analysis, and stated this would bring 
the Company's DCF result down from 13-14 percent to near 12 per-
cent, virtually the same as they had obtained. 
Each witness applied the DCF model to sample companies, 
but differed as to the correct sample. According to Dr. Marcus, 
comparable firms are few in number and the use of reasonable 
measures of risk resulted in a sample that was too small to be 
useful. He therefore used the Moody's gas distribution group of 
firms, abandoning a risk analysis. Dr. Williamson employed several 
measures of risk and comparability to select his eight-company 
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Moody's group, according to Dr. Marcus, and use of the size measure 
results in a different sample. Dr. Marcus criticized the use of 
size as a measure and asserted that no systematic relationship 
between size and risk exists. He also questioned Dr. Williamson's 
use of degree-days as a risk factor, stating that whether fewer 
degree-days correlates with lower risk depends upon volatility of 
weather and a utilityfs ability to deal with it. Such an analysis 
was not presented. Division witness Eatmon examined several 
samples, including one consisting of fA' rated companies. The 
Division argued Dr. Williamson's sample did not yield reasonable 
results, whereas the Division's more encompassing analysis did. 
The main problem identified with the Williamson sample, according 
to the Committee, is the inclusion of one company with a DCF cost 
of capital estimate of 25 percent. It was asserted that a company 
having a market-required return of 25 percent bears no relation to 
Mountain Fuel Supply and does not belong in a sample. 
We can only accept Dr. Williamson's DCF results in part. 
The critique offered by the Division and the Committee witnesses is 
persuasive in three important respects. First, the adjustment to 
bring the dividend to the next period is excessive. Second, the 
sample of firms contains at least one company that, arguably, is 
not comparable, producing an upward bias in the dividend growth 
rate estimate. And third, reliance upon earnings growth rate 
forecasts to estimate the dividend growth rate also imparts an 
upward bias. A cost of equity estimate near those of the other two 
witnesses is obtained when corresponding adjustments are made. On 
this basis, we find the cost of equity to be 12.2 percent. 
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There are reasons why the cost of equity obtained from a 
model may differ from a fair rate of return allowance. Where we 
wish to compensate for outstanding management performance, or to 
provide an incentive for efficiency, or to compensate for extra-
ordinary risk, we can do so by setting a return greater than the 
minimum cost of equity. The converse of this is also true. We can 
adjust where we have reason to believe management has not adequate-
ly met its public service obligations. 
The record contains no evidence suggesting that Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company is either more or less risky than comparable 
gas distribution companies, and Dr. Williamson so testified. Nor 
is there any evidence suggesting that the Company suffers from 
attrition; i.e., the adverse effects of inflation to which manage-
ment is unable to adjust. The record suggests, though without 
benefit of systematic examination, that Company management has 
performed very well in most respects. In two areas, however, 
affiliate relationships and gas supply planning, we take issue with 
the management of the Company's parent, Questar Corporation. 
The record shows that this company has organized and 
reorganized during the 1970s and 1980s in order to capitalize on 
market opportunities, to simplify its relationship with federal and 
state regulatory entities, to clarify its activities for share-
holders, and for other reasons best known to management. In 1984, 
docket number 84-057-10, we permitted the formation of a holding 
company structure, with the utility we regulate as a subsidiary. 
This approval was conditional, however, and the conditions were to 
ensure that we could continue to regulate the utility in the public 
interest. Evidence on this record, however, strongly suggests a 
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deliberate shift of risk from Questar Corporation operations 
generally to the distribution utility and thence to its core 
customers. Affiliate relationships have constrained and inhibited 
the pursuit of least-cost gas supply by the distribution utility. 
Though Questar Pipeline Company's rates and rate structure can 
adversely affect the distribution utility and its core customers, 
the utility has never intervened to represent these interests at 
FERC cases where such rates are determined. We find no convincing 
evidence of an attempt to simulate an arms-length relationship with 
Questar Corporation subsidiaries, or better, to deliberately 
overcome the inherent lack of such a relationship. The chief case 
in point is the assumption by an affiliated company having inter-
ests demonstrably different from the utilityfs of the utilityfs gas 
supply planning, acquisition, and dispatch functions. These issues 
are all discussed at greater length in Section III, pages 34-43. 
In our judgment these actions do not protect the interests of the 
utility's customers. We determine, therefore, to impose an adjust-
ment in the form of a reduction in the allowed rate of return of 10 
basis points. 
In summary, we find that the utility's cost of equity 
capital as determined, in the main, by various discounted cast flow 
analyses, is 12.2 percent. The equity rate of return which we find 
to be just and reasonable, is 12.1 percent. 
2. Capital Structure and Rate of Return on Rate Base 
The cost of capital may vary with the debt-equity ratio. 
For this reason and others, we have at times adopted a hypothetical 
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suggested by sample companies. This capital structure would 
insulate utility customers from the potentially adverse effects of 
subsidiary operations, from management financial decisions that 
might increase the cost of obtaining capital, and from the problem 
of measuring an actual capital structure for a utility that is a 
subsidiary of a holding company. Adoption of a hypothetical 
capital structure is an adjustment similar to the disallowance of 
any unreasonable expense. There are, however, arguments to be 
considered why a hypothetical capital structure should not be 
adopted. 
In the present docket no witness has opened the door to 
these difficult matters. Each testified that the utilityfs actual 
capital structure should be used to determine the overall rate of 
return. It was also clear on the record that the Companyfs actual 
capital struture was within the range of hypothetical capital 
structures calculated from a reasonable sample of companies. All 
p>arties used the same capital structure component weights and 
costs, with the exception of the cost of equity capital, to derive 
the overall rate of return recommended. Substituting the cost of 
equity we have determined to be reasonable, 12.1 percent, produces 
an overall rate of return of 11.03 percent. We find this rate to 
be fair, just and reasonable. We will note, however, a concern 
with the costs of debt and preferred stock in this capital struc-
ture, and request the Division to conduct an examination to deter-
mine if these costs might be reduced. 
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F. Revenue Requirement Summary 
The following table summarizes the revenue requirement 
determinations reached in this proceeding. It presents the deriva-
tion of a revenue requirement deficiency of $76,000. 
OPERATING EXPENSES 
(1) 
1. Operation & Maintenance Expenses 
2. Depreciation, Depletion & Amortiiation 
3. Taxes (Excluding Income Taxes) 
4. Colorado Credits 
5. TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES 
SYSTEM COST BY FUNCTION 
ADJUSTED TEST YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 1989 





























100,960 5,784 4,935 90,241 
6. FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
(Distributed on Rate Base Basis) 13,204 2,295 708 10,201 
RETURN 
(Distributed on Rate Base Basis) 
7. Production 
8. Distribution - Wyoming 
9. - Utah 
10. TOTAL RETURN @ J 
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III. DISCUSSION, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
WITH RESPECT TO GAS SUPPLY 
A. The Gas Supply Function 
The Division's consultants, Theodore Barry and Associates 
("Barry"), performed a qualitative examination of the management 
and technical aspects of the gas supply planning and related 
activities of Mountain Fuel Supply and its affiliates. The 
Committee's consultants, Exeter Associates ("Exeter"), reviewed the 
gas supply procurement arrangements of Mountain Fuel for con-
sistency with a least-cost acquisition strategy. 
The gas supply function can be segmented into four inter-
related areas: load forecasting, design day analysis, gas supply 
planning, and gas supply dispatch. Mountain Fuel's Forecasting and 
Load Research Department develops both load forecasts and design 
day estimates. Beginning with the 1990 planning cycle, Mountain 
Fuel has stated these forecasts will normally be for ten years. 
According to Barry, the management process involved in 
load forecasting and in formulating the design day estimate appear 
to be reasonable and consistent with industry practice. Further, 
Mountain Fuel does do a reasonably good technical job of forecast-
ing the loads of the residential sector. Because the residential 
sector is its most important load, Barry concluded that it is 
likely that Mountain Fuel's cost of service is not substantially 
higher than it would be with better gas load forecasting. In 
addition, the technical considerations of design day for Mountain 
Fuel as a distribution utility are rather straightforward such that 
either the design day issue does not really exist at the Mountain 
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Fuel level or it is significantly less of a technical issue than it 
is at Questar Pipeline Company. 
Questar Pipeline develops and prepares a gas supply plan 
for all gas to be delivered to Mountain Fuel under the terms of the 
Gas Supply, Odorization and Operating Services Agreement between 
Mountain Fuel and Questar Pipeline. The written policy of Questar 
Pipeline filed at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") 
essentially says that Questar Pipeline will use its best efforts in 
consideration of all its operating and contractual requirements to 
provide its jurisdictional customer, Mountain Fuel, with reliable 
supplies at the lowest achievable cost. 
Mountain Fuel has two sources of gas supply, its own 
production and contract purchases from Questar Pipeline at rates 
established by the FERC. Mountain Fuel is Questar Pipelined only 
sales customer and Questar Pipeline is the only source of contract 
purchases for Mountain Fuel. Mountain Fuelfs own production is 
operated by WEXPRO, a Questar affiliate, under the terms of the 
WEXPRO Agreement. For planning purposes, WEXPRO supplies Mountain 
Fuel with reserve and deliverability estimates of Mountain Fuelfs 
own production. Mountain Fuel determines the quantity of such 
reserves expected to be produced by WEXPRO during the planning 
period. 
Mountain Fuel supplies its gas load and design day 
forecasts, along with the desired production from Mountain Fuel's 
own sources to Questar Pipeline. Questar Pipeline incorporates the 
Mountain Fuel information with Questar Pipeline data relating to 
reserves, deliverability, and contractual requirements of purchase 
e r a s finurr.PS. T h e 1 a - H - ^ v <{ r*s-«1 I I / 4 A C « r ^ i * * • :« ,_ T* ~ ^ . 
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("Celsius"), an exploration and production subsidiary all of whose 
production is purchased by Questar Pipeline for resale to Mountain 
Fuel. 
Questar Pipeline determines a gas supply plan using an 
economic optimization model, the Gas Contract Analyzer ("GCA") 
model. The gas supply plan is returned to Mountain Fuel for 
review, further modification, and ultimate agreement with Questar 
Pipeline. Questar Pipeline then implements the plan by means of a 
non-optimization model, the Gas Dispatch and Cost (GDC) model. 
Mountain Fuel monitors the implementation of the plan through 
monthly written reports and review meetings and daily dispatch 
review meetings. 
According to Mountain Fuel, the GCA model is used to 
develop strategy to deal with uncertainty by undertaking sensi-
tivity studies and analyzing contingencies. Mountain Fuel claimed 
the model is not well suited for the development of an annual gas 
supply plan and there is not a focus on one specific GCA result as 
an optimized solution to be replicated by the GDC model. 
Both Barry and Exeter claimed that Questar Pipeline's use 
of the GCA model did not provide a least-cost gas supply plan, that 
Mountain Fuel personnel did not possess a technical understanding 
of the GCA model and its use by Questar Pipeline, and that Mountain 
Fuel management lacked oversight and control of Questar Pipeline. 
They also stated that Mountain Fuel's lack of oversight of its 
pipeline supplier and the fact that it does not purchase either 
spot or other market gas is relatively unique in the industry. 
According to Barry, the gas dispatch performed by Questar 
Pipeline for Mountain Fuel is cruite crood -in f^af *-v>^  -^' «•—*• 
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instructions developed by the GDC implement well what the GCA 
calculates to be the gas supply plan. 
Although disputed issues remain among the parties con-
cerning the gas supply planning function, the Commission finds that 
possible improvements in the load forecasting, the design day esti-
mate , and the gas dispatch functions, while desirable, are unlikely 
to substantially reduce the annual costs of gas supply* 
B. Corporate Organization and Affiliate Relations 
The current form of corporate organization reflects the 
corporate objective of reducing what it views as duplicative 
regulation, with Mountain Fuel subject to regulation by this 
Commission, its sister affiliate Questar Pipeline subject to 
regulation by the FERC, and WEXPRO, unregulated. 
Mountain Fuel contracts with Questar Pipeline and WEXPRO 
are effectively cost-plus contracts. The only oversight Mountain 
Fuel has of Questar Pipeline is through FERC regulation and two 
independent monitors provide oversight of WEXPRO. 
Mountain Fuel stated that decisions regarding gas supply 
often involve conflicts between the interests of Mountain Fuel and 
Questar Pipeline. When such conflicts of interest do arise, they 
are resolved within Questar Corporation. Since disputes are effec-
tively resolved by the corporate parent, independent arms-length 
transactions and adversarial relationships cannot be expected to 
occur among affiliated economic entities. 
Mountain Fuel further stated that any major proposal that 
Questar Pipeline makes at the FERC is the result of internal 
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only one of which is Mountain Fuel. The proposals it makes at the 
FERC are the result of internal consensus and attempt to balance 
the interests of the various entities involved# including the 
shareholders of Questar Corporation. 
Recent Questar Pipeline cost-of-service and rate design 
issues at the FERC have resulted in a shift of costs from other 
customers of Questar Pipeline to Mountain Fuel. Mountain Fuel has 
never participated at FERC in a Questar Pipeline rate proceeding. 
The Division, not Mountain Fuel, intervenes at FERC on behalf of 
Mountain Fuel's ratepayers. 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that the 
current organizational structure of Questar Corporation and pattern 
of regulation provide an opportunity for Mountain Fuel to bear a 
disproportionate share of the risks facing Questar Corporation and, 
in particular, for Questar Pipeline to subsidize its activities in 
other markets by shifting costs to Mountain Fuel. Further, inter-
affiliate agreements and regulatory oversight of affiliates are not 
a substitute for utility management oversight and control. 
C. The GCA Gas Planning Model and its Use by Questar Pipeline 
The objective of the gas supply plan provided by the GCA 
model is to minimize the net present value of gas acquisition costs 
consistent with supply reliability over the planning horizon. The 
model is limited by a number of operational requirements and 
constraints, and the forecast information available to the company 
at the time the plan was prepared. Operational requirements and 
constraints include the use of Mountain Fuel's own production, 
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must-take purchase contracts with Questar Pipeline, and the use of 
Questar Pipeline storage. 
Mountain Fuel's own production is not subject to optimi-
zation within the model but is exogenous to the model. Mountain 
Fuel stated what it has done is consistent with the stipulation 
reached with the Division. Mountain Fuel stated that in the future 
it would like to investigate the modeling of economic optimization 
of its own production. 
Exeter agreed with the testimony of Division witness 
Darrell Hanson concluding that prices of gas obtained under the 
WEXPRO Agreement compare favorably with alternative sources. 
However, Exeter expressed concern that Mountain Fuel has little 
control over when WEXPRO decides to develop new wells and the 
supply of gas forthcoming from such wells in relation to Mountain 
Fuel's demand needs and other supply options. 
The GCA models all gas supplies as contracts requiring 
the aggregation of data describing approximately 1,700 individual 
wells into 30 contract or well groups for use by the GCA. The data 
provided to Barry by Questar Pipeline segmented wells on the basis 
of load factor thus preventing the GCA model from optimizing across 
well groups with respect to price. Mountain Fuel claimed the data 
provided to Barry was in the process of being updated for use by a 
new version of the GCA. No party disputed the need for segmenting 
well groups on the basis of price as well as load factor. 
Originally the GCA model did not treat take-or-pay 
issues. Mountain Fuel designed a method for modeling take-or-pay 
in which the objective is to reduce Questar Pipeline's exposure to 
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take-or-pay penalty rates in order to constrain the model to deal 
with must-take sources of gas supply, thus passing take-or-pay 
liabilities of Questar Pipeline on to Mountain Fuel. There is no 
provision in the GCA model which allows a buy-out or buy-down of 
take-or-pay liabilities. 
Spot market purchases were effectively eliminated as a 
feasible alternative since, if a unit of spot gas is taken, the 
full amount of the the take-or-pay liability on the gas that is not 
taken must be paid in full. 
The model constrains the use of storage consistent with 
FERC-imposed dates that permit Questar Pipeline to take and replace 
gas from storage. Questar Pipeline provides storage as a part of 
firm sales or transportation service. Questar Pipeline's storage 
costs are recovered in FERC firm sales (CD-I) and transportation 
(T-l) rates. Questar Pipeline does not provide unbundled storage 
service. 
Since Questar Pipeline does not offer unbundled storage, 
the model does not contain as a feasible alternative Mountain Fuel 
purchases from independent third parties with Questar Pipeline 
providing transportation and storage service. The sole source of 
gas supply to Mountain Fuel beyond its own production is Questar 
Pipeline. The Kern River and WyCal pipeline proposals are not 
considered feasible sources of supply due to the low load factor of 
Mountain Fuelfs demand and the need for storage to serve such a low 
load factor customer. Although FERC determines the timing of 
storage use and the method by which storage costs are recovered in 
rates, such determinations can be changed in future FERC 
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Actual historical data was not available to Barry thus 
preventing Barry from quantifying the effect on gas costs of 
operating in a manner different from that modeled by Questar 
Pipeline. Further, no party recommended an adjustment to revenue 
requirement as a result of analyzing the GCA model and its use by 
Questar Pipeline. 
The Commission finds that the use of the GCA model by 
Questar Pipeline may not provide a long term least-cost integrated 
resource plan. The Mountain Fuel contracts with Questar Pipeline 
and WEXPRO are cost-plus contractsf and are not the result of arms-
length transactions but result from a single economic interest. 
Mountain Fuel's own production and contract purchases from Questar 
Pipeline are. the only sources of gas supply treated in the GCA 
model. Economic optimization of Mountain Fuel's own production is 
lacking. The GCA model excludes FERC reconsideration of take-or-
pay liabilities or use of storage over the planning horizon. 
Finally, spot market and independent third party sources are not 
supply options, and demand side considerations are absent. 
D. Conclusions 
The Commission finds that the current practice of the gas 
supply planning and purchase functions residing within Questar 
Pipeline is not in the public interest. 
We recognize that there may be problems with implementing 
these functions within Mountain Fuel. The current unavailability 
of unbundled storage and transportation in the tariffs set by FERC 
for Questar Pipeline is one such problem which comes immediately to 
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implementing changes in the gas supply planning and purchasing 
functions. 
The Commission has two primary goals in consideration of 
the gas supply planning function. The first goal is to create a 
method which duplicates arms-length transactions between Mountain 
Fuel and the Questar family of companies. The second goal is to 
design a method, for the long term, to provide the lowest priced 
gas supply to Mountain Fuel ratepayers without any regard to 
corporate structure or the needs of the corporate parent or affili-
ates. In light of these goals, the Commission finds that the gas 
planning function of Mountain Fuel should be moved from Questar 
Pipeline to Mountain Fuel. 
Two events present an opportunity for Mountain Fuel to be 
considering what its future options are: 1) take-or-pay liabilities 
or take requirements that present take-or-pay liabilities come to 
an end in the 1993-94 timeframe; and 2) complete deregulation of 
gas occurs in 1993. A review of a long-term least-cost integrated 
resource plan for Mountain Fuel cannot be made in 1993 when Questar 
Pipeline has already made commitments to continue to fulfill its 
function and responsibilities to Mountain Fuel. Therefore the 
Commission finds that Mountain Fuel is to provide a long-term 
least-cost integrated resource plan within six months for review by 
the Commission and other interested parties. Mountain Fuel is to 
provide the funding necessary, as pre-approved by the Commission, 
to allow the Division and the Committee to contract with con-
sultants for a management audit follow-up. The Commission will 
allow inclusion of such funding as an expense in the 191 Account. 
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The Commission further finds that a task force is to be 
established to consider the various issues that have arisen in this 
case. Issues to be considered shall include but need not be 
limited to the following: 
1. How the gas planning function is to be returned to 
Mountain Fuel; 
2. Recommendations of Barry concerning load forecasting, 
design day estimation, and gas supply dispatch; 
3. Recommendations of Barry and Exeter concerning the use of 
the GCA model; 
4. Cost/benefit analyses of relaxing model constraints; 
5. Possible changes in FERC regulation necessary to increase 
the feasible options of Mountain Fuel and/or reduce the 
limitations of constraints including, among other issues, 
the availability of transportation service, the use of 
storage, the unbundling of storage service, the possible 
buy-down of take-or-pay liabilities, and the availability 
of spot market sources; 
6. The investment incentives facing WEXPRO and the resulting 
economic impact on Mountain Fuel; 
7. The maintenance of a historical data base and recommen-
dations for annual review of gas supply decisions; and 
8. The relevance and applicability of planning and dispatch 
models to the development of an annual gas supply plan 
for ratemaking purposes. 
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IV. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO 
RATE SPREAD AND RATE DESIGN 
A. Stipulated Cost of Service and Rate Design 
Cost of service and most rate design issues in this 
docket were resolved by a stipulation of the parties that we 
tentatively accepted on September 5, 1990, and finally approve with 
this order. A copy is appended. 
B. Disputed Issues 
1. General Service (GS) Rate Design 
Three general service rate design proposals were present-
ed which if accepted would alter customer charge and block elements 
of the rate. Currently, the rate consists of a $5 customer charge 
and two declining blocks. Division witness Compton proposed to 
replace the two blocks with three in order to better track intra-
class cost-of-service differences tending to harm larger customers. 
He also proposed a summer/winter differential in GS-1 rates based 
on seasonal gas cost differences. The Company proposed increasing 
the customer service charge to $6. The Committee opposed both the 
Company's $6 customer charge and, testifying on the importance of 
price signals for conservation, the Divisionfs three-block recom-
mendation, suggesting a flattened two-block structure instead. The 
Committee also opposed the summer/ winter differential, in part, on 
grounds that low-income households would be harmed by it. 
Our rate design decisions are guided by a number of 
objectives including efficiency, conservation, equity, stability, 
and simplicity. We have described these at length in the past and 
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wish to say here only that the objectives may be in conflict at 
times. Cost-of-service based rates are an important means of 
attaining equity and efficiency, and, some would argue, conserva-
tion as well. 
We have no desire to change rates just for the sake of 
having done it. In this docket, we must change them as to amount; 
structure is another matter. Rates for general service customers 
will go up for three reasons: increased commodity costs in the 
pass-through part of this proceeding (see Report and Order, Docket 
Nos. 90-057-02, 90-057-07, October 31, 1990); the stipulation 
redresses an inequity which shifts costs from interruptible trans-
portation customers to general service customers; and a small 
increase in revenue requirement. 
General service rate structure changes have been present-
ed to us as proposals to make rates more closely conform to the 
costs of providing service, thereby addressing intraclass inequity 
and sending the proper price signals about seasonal variation in 
gas costs. These are small changes and not the only way to address 
the problem. They are also controversial proposals, and have in 
fact been opposed in this proceeding, including substantial opposi-
tion by public witnesses. They raise questions about which rate-
making objectives might be attained and which not. For instance, 
not all parties define conservation in the same way and, given 
this, oppose a declining block rate, however much it may be cost-
based. Rate stability is also a concern. Simplicity and under-
standability are also rate design objectives, and both would be 
confounded by the introduction of an increased customer charge, a 
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In our judgment, now is not the time to implement these 
changes. By accepting the stipulation on cost of service and rate 
design, we have resolved some matters and opened the door to 
others. We require a dispassionate examination of rate structure, 
which permits alternatives to be identified and analyzed. We find 
that the increase in customer charge, the change from a two-block 
declining rate, and the summer/winter differential should not be 
implemented at this time. 
2. Utah Energy Office Proposal 
The Utah Energy Office ("UEO") has proposed what it calls 
an "Energy Efficiency Tariff" for interruptible transportation 
("IT") customers of Mountain Fuel Supply. In order to qualify for 
service under this tariff, IT customers would have to submit a 
brief plan committing three cents per decatherm of expected usage 
toward direct natural gas efficiency improvements. The UEO pro-
vided only general guidelines of how the proposal would be imple-
mented, and this lack of specificity raised concerns among the 
various industrial intervenors who stated that the record was 
insufficient to support the need for and merit of the proposal. 
The UEO based its proposal on two major premises. First, 
the current relatively low cost for transported gas does not 
provide sufficient incentives for energy efficiency measures or 
proper market signals as to the risk of significantly higher future 
gas prices. Second, since the IT customers may retain the option 
of returning to the system as interruptible sales customers at 
average cost pricing, they are not fully exposed to the risk of a 
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customers to under-invest in energy efficiency/conservation to the 
potential future detriment of other customers and society in 
general. 
The Commission recognizes the problem that existing 
market signals may not be sufficient to adequately provide long-
term incentives for cost-effective investment in energy efficiency. 
They may also not promote global competitiveness of United States 
(or Utah) companies. This is a problem which must be addressed, 
both nationally and locally. 
It is not clear, however, that the IT customers, with 
their relatively high load factors, will ever wish to return to 
interruptible sales customer status given the impact on average gas 
costs of the lower load factor GS-1 customers. The parties have 
agreed, and the Commission concurs, that this issue should be 
analyzed in a future proceeding. 
The Commission has the statutory authority to encourage 
the conservation of resources and energy in determining just and 
reasonable rates under Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1. Notwithstanding 
the sketchy nature of the Energy Office proposal, the Commission 
would perhaps have considered implementing it, or a similar 
proposal in this case were it not for the fact that we are adopting 
a cost-of-service stipulation in this case, signed by all parties 
including the Utah Energy Office. This proposal would alter the 
result of that stipulation which we have adopted. As we have 
indicated in Docket No. 90-2035-01, the least-cost planning pro-
ceeding for PacifiCorp, it is appropriate to address future 
capacity and energy needs during a period of relative excess supply 
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Similarly it is appropriate for the Commission to address future 
supply and demand issues, including efficient utilization of 
natural gas supplied or transmitted by Mountain Fuel Supply, during 
the current period of relative demand and supply balance in natural 
gas markets. 
We commend the Utah Energy Office for bringing energy 
efficiency issues forward at this time. In the rate design portion 
of this order, we rejected GS-1 tariff concepts which would, 
perhaps, send a better signal to customers to invest in energy 
efficiency. This, not because the Commission rejects consideration 
of such concepts, but rather that a more comprehensive look at 
rates and energy efficiency is appropriate before the changes are 
made. We have elsewhere in this order determined that we will 
initiate an integrated resource planning effort for Mountain Fuel 
Supply. We hereby find that the Utah Energy Office proposal will 
not be adopted in this docket, but will request that the Utah 
Energy Office consider its proposal in the integrated resource plan 
context and participate in that process. The potential may exist 
for additional "windows of opportunity" for a program, such as the 
one proposed by the Utah Energy Office, in future cases. The 
Commission will require that it be analyzed within the broader 
implications of efficiency incentives for all ratepayers prior to 
implementation. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. The Company file revised schedules and tariffs reflecting 
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calculated to result in annual revenues of $139,533,000 and yield 
an overall annual return of 11.03 percent beginning December 1, 
1990. 
2. The stipulation proposed by the parties on cost-of-
service and the rate design issues in this case is approved and 
adopted as appended hereto. 
3. The Company henceforth assume and carry the burden of 
justifying all interaffiliate transactions that bear on rates and 
services in all future proceedings. 
4. The Company's actual capital structure is adopted, but we 
order that the Division shall conduct an examination of that 
capital structure to determine whether or not the costs of debt and 
preferred stock can be reduced. 
5. The gas-planning function presently performed for the 
Company by Questar Pipeline shall be transferred to the Company. 
6. The Company shall provide the Commission, Division and 
interested parties with a long-term, least-cost integrated resource 
plan within six months of this Order. 
7. The Division shall establish a task force hereafter to 
consider various issues arising in this case which shall include 
but not be limited to the issues set forth on page 43. 
8. To the extent that the Commission has inadvertently 
omitted from the ordering provisions of this Order any duty or 
obligation intended to be imposed upon the Company or Division, 
which duty or obligation is otherwise clear from the language of 
the the preceding portions of this Order, it is hereby incorporated 
herein by this reference and made a part hereof. 
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9. Any party, or any stockholder, bondholder, or other 
person pecuniarily interested in the Company may apply for rehear-
ing of any matter determined herein. The application for rehearing 
must be filed within 30 days after the issue date of this Order. An 
application for rehearing not granted by the Commission within 20 
days after filing is denied. If the application for rehearing is 
denied, a petition seeking judicial review of any matter determined 
in the Order must be filed within 30 days of the date the 
application is denied. 
DATED in Salt Lake City, Utah this 21st day of November, 
1990. 
- -' / fli^g^ 
Br i a n ' T . S tewar t , fchairman 
Japies M. Byrne, Commissioner j vu. 
Stephen F. Mecham, Commissioner 
Attest: 
C.IW# 
Stephen C. Hewlett, Commission Secretary 
CONCURRENCE OF CHAIRMAN BRIAN T. STEWART AND DISSENT IN PART 
I cannot concur with the decision of my fellow commis-
sioners rejecting the 10 percent disallowance for affiliate trans-
actions proposed by the Committee. In the last U.S. West rate 
case, docket number 88-049-07, the Commission expressed its con-
- — - -~ —» «.w«t,,4. * * ^ , 1 ^ f a 4->»a,ne»r«+" "i one* 
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affiliated transactions falls squarely upon the utility. We 
further stated that we would look at the reasonableness with which 
the utility responded to efforts by regulators to obtain informa-
tion about affiliate transactions (referred to in this case as the 
attitude test). In my view, the Company failed both tests. 
The first test was clearly not met by the Company inas-
much as it made practically no effort to substantiate the reason-
ableness of its affiliate transactions. Fortunately for the 
Company, the Division undertook a comprehensive look at such 
transactions, sufficient to satisfy my fellow commissioners. I 
believe that the utilities that we regulate must be on notice that 
inasmuch as they control the corporate structure which they choose 
to use, as well as the inter-affiliate transactions made, that the 
burden must fall totally upon them to justify each and every 
affiliate transaction—which transactions are encumbered by a 
presumption of suspicion and self-serving. Utilization of already 
stretched regulatory resources to seek-and-find-something-wrong is 
unacceptable to me. Regulators should only be required to review 
the affirmative case made by the utility. 
It has been asserted that the Company passed the attitude 
test because it willingly made available whatever the Division 
requested. I believe that this assertion failed to take into 
account the Motion to Compel that the Division was forced to file 
in May of this year, and the effort of the Company to use tr n 
affiliate shield as justification for not making the appropriate 
gas supply models and necessary data available to the Division and 
the Committee. Though this was an isolated incident, in my mind it 
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I believe my fellow commissioners have been unduly 
patient with the Company on this issue, and I believe the Company 
should be grateful for their tolerance. 
4 Ob. >/&(/ 
Bri T. Stewart, Chairman 
f \ ' > O •-% U « 
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AND TARIFFS OF MOUNTAIN FUEL 
SUPPLY COMPANY 
RATES ; 
| CASE NO. 89-057-15 
) STIPULATION REGARDING | DESIGN | ISSUES AND 
RATE 
COST ALLOCATION 
The undersigned parties hereby enter into the following 
Stipulation regarding Rate Design and Cost Allocation Issues in 
this case. The undersigned parties jointly move the Commission 
to approve and adopt this Settlement in its entirety. 
This Stipulation, if accepted by the Commission, will 
resolve most of the rate design and cost allocation issues raised 
by the parties in this case. It employs the company's cost of 
service and rate design proposals, with stated modifications. 
Attached as Exhibit "A" is a cost of service allocation 
reflecting the parties' agreement. As soon as practicable, 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company will prepare and supply to all 
parties and the Commission the tariff modifications that will be 
required as a result of this Stipulation. 
The only rate design and tariff issues not resolved by 
this Stipulation are the GS-1 rate design, a winter/summer 
commodity rate differential and an Energy Efficiency 
Transportation Tariff. This Stipulation doe not address issues 
relating to revenue requirement, rate of return, affiliated 
interests or gas procurement. 
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I. ISSUES ON WHICH AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED 
The parties have reached agreement on, and request 
Commission approval of, the following issues: 
A. Rate Design, 
1. The functionalization, classification, 
allocation and rate design principles embodied in the Application 
and testimony of Mountain Fuel Supply Company (the "Company") 
have been utilized, except as indicated herein.- Among other 
things, the Company's treatment of distribution mains has been 
retained. Changes from current tariffs and practices which are 
included in the Company's filing, and adopted in this 
Stipulation, include a consolidated interruptible sales class 
(Rate Schedule I), a consolidated interruptible transportation 
class (Rate Schedule IT), and the apportionment of production 
costs on a volumetric basis to sales customers only. 
2. Feeder main costs are classified 45% demand 
and 55% commodity. The demand component has been allocated on 
allocation base 1 (peak day) and the commodity component has been 
allocated on allocation base 2 (volume). 
3. The distribution system related non-gas costs 
and pipeline related non-gas costs have been eliminated from the 
F-3 commodity charge, and the commodity charge has been 
calculated using cost of service principles. 
4. The definition of "winter" season for all 
allocation and pricing purposes has been changed to November 1 -
March 31. 
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5, Administrative and General Expenses are 
allocated to each customer class on a pro rata basis, by using a 
weighted class allocator which is based on the allocation of the 
sum of the five distribution cost sub-functions (e.g. Feeders, 
Large Diameter Mains, Network Costs, Meter Reading, and On-
Premise Service). 
B. Tariff Issues, 
1. The 2,000 Dth/day contract maximum has been 
eliminated from the F-3 tariff (§ 2.05, F-3(c)). 
2. The qualifying period for waiver of the five 
cent surcharge in the IT tariff (§ 3.17(1)(3)) has been changed 
to November 1 - March 31. 
3. Issues raised by certain industrial 
intervenors regarding the minimum load factor charge in the IT 
tariff (§ 3.17(j); §3.15(f)) will not be considered in this case. 
4. The 100 Dth/day minimum in Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company's proposed IT tariff (§2.10-IT(a)) has been 
eliminated. 
5. The parties agree that issues relating to 
whether, and at what cost, transportation customers can convert 
back to interruptible sales customers should not be resolved in 
this case and may be reserved for a future docket. 
II. UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
The only rate design and tariff issues not resolved by 
this Stipulation are as follows: 
A. The customer service charge and rate design for 
the GS-1 class* 
B* A winter/summer commodity rate differential. 
€• An Energy Efficiency Transportation Tariff. 
III. OTHER ISSUES 
A. This Stipulation is intended by the parties to be 
an integrated settlement for purposes of this case of all of the 
rate design and cost allocation issues addressed herein. If the 
Commission does not approve all or any part of the issues 
resolved in Section I of this Settlement, no party shall be bound 
by this Settlement, each party shall be free to support any 
position on rate design and cost allocation issues, and this 
Settlement Agreement, and all documents, discussions and 
negotiations relating to the same, shall be privileged and not 
admissible for any purpose. 
B. The parties agree to support this Stipulation in 
good faith and to urge Commission approval of the same. The 
parties shall submit testimony to explain and support this 
Stipulation and the unresolved issues. 
C. Execution of this Stipulation by any party shall 
not constitute an acknowledgement or acceptance of the validity 
or invalidity of any particular method, theory, or principle of 
ratemaking or allocation in any other or future case. 
D# This Stipulation may be executed in one or more 
counterparts and, upon execution, each executed counterpart shall 
be part of the same agreement as though all parties had executed 
-4-
/"N /A *~1 #-* * 
the same document. Any signature page may be detached from any 
counterpart without impairing the legal effect of any signatures 
and may be attached to another counterpart of this Stipulation. 
DATED this XJLhd day of (LULAIIZ^T , 1990. 
7 
Gary G. Sackett ^ 
Patricia S. Drawe 
James A. Holtkamp 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company 
Q/'onhuj of. Yhd&— 
Laurie L. Noda 
Division of Public Utilities 
Kent L. Walgr,en 
Committee of 'Consumer Services 
CfotUtO VD, f)Q k/ fan-
Char les M. D 
Magnesium on of America 
Robertv' i\ Reeder 
KennecottCorporation and Hercules, 
Inc. j&£-*4. 
Kenneth 'G. Hurwftz 
Nucor Steel 
gs/g-u2dp.gad 82090 -5-
James A. Simpson 
Phillips Petroleum 
Bruce J, Barnard 
Hill Air Force Base 
David S. Christensen 
Utah Energy Office 
Brian W. Burnett 
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Investigation ) DOCKET NO. 89-057-15 
of the Reasonableness of the Rates ) 
and Tariffs of MOUNTAIN FUEL ) ORDER ON APPLICATION 
SUPPLY COMPANY. ) FOR REHEARING 
ISSUED: January 10. 1991 
BY THE COMMISSION: 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company ("Mountain Fuel" or "Company") 
filed with the Commission an Application for Rehearing 
("Application") of our Order of November 21, 1990 in the above-
entitled and numbered matter on December 21, 1990. The Committee of 
Consumer Services and the Division of Public Utilities have filed 
responsive memoranda. 
The Company's Application raises numerous issues most of which 
we are persuaded have been adequately dealt with in our Order of 
November 21, 1990. However, with respect to three issues we feel 
constrained to supplement our Order. 
1* Post-test year adjustments. 
The Company argues that because the Commission allowed post-
test year adjustments in U.S. West Docket No. 88-049-07, issued 
October 18, 1989, it must find them appropriate in this Docket or 
provide some rationale for a departure from its prior "practice". 
63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). At this point in time we consider the 
historic test year without post-test year adjustments to be 
DOCKET NO. 89-057-15 
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appropriate and reasonable and the allowance of post-test year 
adjustments or future test years to be exceptional. The choice of 
test years lies within the discretion of the Commission based upon 
a clear showing by the utility that its case merits special treat-
ment. If that were not so, the existence of Section 54-4-4 (3) 
would be superfluous. 
In retrospect, we allowed U.S. West to make post-test year 
adjustments without having adequately justified them. If we were 
making that decision today, there is little doubt that those 
adjustments would not be granted in the absence of additional 
factual justification from U.S. West. As was indicated by the 
Supreme Court in Utah Department of Business Regulation v. the 
Public Service Commission, 614 P2d 1242 (1980) at 1249, 
"In evaluating an application, the fundamental 
principle involved is that post-test year adjustments 
to expenses must be matched with post-test-year revenue 
increases which might offset additional expenditures.. 
..To be entitled to an adjustment for increased wage 
and salary expense the applicant must sustain its eviden-
tiary burden to establish these payroll increases will 
not be offset by productivity and increased sales." 
In our judgment, Mountain Fuel has not on this record 
justified the employment of post-test year adjustments. 
Furthermore, we do not agree with the argument that our 
granting of the post-test year adjustments in the U.S. West case 
constitutes a Commission "practice" that now needs to be explained 
and justified in this case. 
00218 
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Having so stated our current preference on test year, we will 
also reiterate our statement on page 7 of our November 21, 1990 
Order. 
"In future proceedings, the Commission will decide 
issues concerning test year, rate base, out-of-period 
adjustments, and related matters prior to the onset of 
hearings and based on the then existing conditions of the 
utility and the economy in which it is operating." 
The historic test year, which is our current preference, is no 
more "set in concrete" than was our previous use of future test 
years when the conditions required it. 
2. The reduction of the rate of return on equity from 12.2% 
to 12.1%. 
The Company complains that our reduction of return on equity 
from 12.2% to 12.1% is not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record, that it is arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of Commission 
discretion, that it circumvents federal preemption of rate 
regulation and that it constitutes a penalty or reparation outside 
our statutory authority. 
It is safe to say that setting rates, a part of which is the 
establishment of the return on equity, is not a precise science. 
The statute allows us to consider a number of factors in reaching 
rate determinations considered "just and reasonable". Preeminent 
among these factors is the judgment of expert witnesses subjected 
to cross-examination on the record. However, the importance of that 
one factor does not preclude the Commission's taking other factors 
/.ma* 
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into consideration, including such things as the utility's 
affiliate relationships, once we have established a zone or range 
of reasonable rates of return on equity. In this Docket, we infer 
from the expert testimony a range from around 11.6% to something 
less than 13%. While the extremes of this range are subject to 
debate and judgment, the rate we have allowed the Company, 12.1%, 
is squarely within the range, even though it is based at least in 
part on our perception of the Company fs behavior with its 
affiliates. 
3. Inconsistent treatment of certain other test year 
adjustments. 
Among other adjustments argued to have been given inconsistent 
is one involving five industrial customers with increased 
purchases. The claim is that among these five industrial customers 
is one who made a deferred main extension payment excluded by the 
Commission. The net effect the Company asserts would be $266,000 in 
additional revenues. We have examined the Company's exhibits on 
which this claimed discrepancy is based and find them inconclusive, 
which is another way of saying that the information is not there. 
Nevertheless, we will allow the Company to clarify the exhibits and 
anticipate that the Company will approach the other parties with a 
view to having this adjustment stipulated and included in the Order 
by way of an addendum. 
JCC164 
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ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mountain Fuel's 
Application for Rehearing be and is hereby denied save for the 
matter set forth in Section 3 hereof• 
Notice is hereby given that a petition seeking judicial review 
of the Commission's Order must be filed within 30 days of the date 
of the denial of the application for rehearing. 
DATED in Salt Lake City, Utah this 10th day of January, 1991. 
^21 
BrianfT. Stewart. Chairman 
Jam#s M. Byrne, Commissioner 
<3U.£ / 7/ / — t / // y 
Stephen/T. Mecham', Commissioner 
Attest: 
tfepnen C. Hewlett, Comm: ission Secretary 
ADDENDUM 2 
ADDENDUM 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(4) (1990) (in relevant part): 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis 
of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction con-
ferred by any statute; . . . 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied 
the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure 
or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed proce-
dures; . . . 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the 
agency by statute; (ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; (iii) 
contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency 
justifies inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demon-
strate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or (iv) 
otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1 (1990). 
All charges made, demanded or received by any public utility 
. . . for any product or commodity furnished or to be furnished, or 
for any service rendered or to be rendered, shall be just and reason-
able. Every unjust or unreasonable charge made, demanded or 
received for such product or commodity or service is hereby prohib-
ited and declared unlawful. Every public utility shall furnish, pro-
vide and maintain such service, instrumentalities, equipment and 
facilities as will promote the safety, health, comfort and convenience 
of its patrons, employees and the public, and as will be in all respect 
adequate, efficient, just and reasonable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12(2)(b) (1990): 
The commission shall, after reasonable notice, hold a hearing 
to determine whether the proposed rate increase or decrease, or some 
other rate increase or decrease, is just and reasonable. 
Utah Constitution, art 1, § 7. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
U. S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, § 1. 
. . . [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
D89-011A\ADD1.BFI 
ADDENDUM 3 
UTAH PSC PROCEEDINGS IN DOCKET NO. 89-057-15 
1990 1991 
First rate-effective 12 months 
12-1-90 New rates become effective 
11-21-90 PSC issues final order 
9-5-90 Hearings commence (end 9-28-90) 
3-31 90 MFS files rate request 




PREVIOUS MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY 
RATE PROCEEDINGS 
Docket No. Case Filed Final Order 
7113-11 Mar. 27, 1975 Dec. 1, 1975 
77-057-03 Apr. 4, 1977 Dec. 29, 1985 
79-057-03 Mar. 30, 1979 Aug. 17, 1979 
80-057-01 Oct. 16, 1979 Aug. 10, 1981 
82-057-15 Sept. 3, 1982 May 2, 1983 
83-057-12 July 1, 1983 Sept. 2, 1983 
84-057-07 Aug. 8, 1984 Apr. 30, 1985 
Future Test Year Approved 
Report and Order at 5, f 9 
Report and Order at 5, If 5 
Report and Order, Stipu-
lation, Ex. 1. 
Motion to Adopt Stipula-
tion, Joint Ex. 1. 
Preliminary Order at 2, 
1(a) 
Stipluation at 2, H 1 
Final Report and Order at 
5, H 3; at 8, H 6-7; at 13, 
H12. 
89-057-15 Mar. 30, 1990 Nov. 21, 1990 Order at 7 
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ADDENDUM 5 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
--O0O--
In the Matter of the 
Investigation of the 
Reasonableness of the Rates 
and Tariffs of Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company. 
Case No. 89-057-15 
REPORTER1S TRANSCRIPT 
OF PROCEEDINGS 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Tuesday, November 7, 1989 
10:00 a.m. 
BEFORE: 
BRIAN T. (TED) STEWART, Chairman, Public 
Service Commission of Utah; 
JAMES M. BYRNE, Commissioner, Public 
Service Commission of Utah; 
STEPHEN MECHAM, Commissioner, Public 
Service Commission of Utah. 
--0O0--
€©PY 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 
160 E. 300 S. 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 530-6693 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR MOUNTAIN 
SUPPLY: 
FUEL PATRICIA S. DRAWE, ESQ. 
GARY G. SACKETT, ESQ. 
180 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84139 
FOR THE DIVISION OF MICHAEL GINSBERG, ESQ. 
PUBLIC UTILITIES: LAURIE NODA, ESQ. 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
FOR THE COMMITTEE 
OF CONSUMER 
SERVICES: 
KENT WALGREN, ESQ. 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
FOR CENTRAL VALLEY 
WATER RECLAMATION 
FACILITY: 
BRIAN W. BURNETT, ESQ. 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker 
Kennecott Building, Suite 800 




GARY A. DODGE, ESQ. 
Kimball, Parr, Crockett & 
Waddoups 
185 S. State Street, #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FOR KENNECOTT, F. ROBERT REEDER, ESQ. 
AMOCO OIL COMPANY, Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
HERCULES, AND WEST- 185 S. State 
ERN ZIRCONIUM A Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DIVISION OF WESTING-
HOUSE: 
1 Date: November 7, 1989 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
2 
3 P R O C E E D I N G _ S 
4 COM. STEWART: Let's go on the record in 
5 docket number 89-057-15 in the matter of the 
6 investigation of the reasonableness of the rates and 
7 tariffs of Mountain Fuel Supply Company. This 
8 matter is before the Commission pursuant to a notice 
9 of prehearing which was filed by the Commission on 
10 October 31st indicating the Company's intent to 
11 undertake an investigation of the reasonableness of 
12 the rates of Mountain Fuel Supply and setting today 
13 as a prehearing to set dates for that rate case. If 
14 we could first take appearances for the record. 
15 MS. DRAWE: Patricia S. Drawe and Gary 
16 Sackett for Mountain Fuel Supply Company. 
17 MR. WALGREN: Kent Walgren for the 
18 Committee of Consumer Services. 
19 MS. NODA: Laurie Noda appearing on 
20 behalf of the Division of Public Utilities. 
21 MR. DODGE: Gary Dodge appearing on 
22 behalf of Basic Manufacturing and Technologies of 
23 Utah. 
24 MR. REEDER: F. Robert Reeder of the firm 
25 of Parsons, <3ehle an<3 Cm timer. We appear this 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 
(801) 530-6693 
morning for Kennecott, Amoco Oil Company, Western 
Zirconium a Division of Westinghouse and Hercules, 
Inc • 
MR. BURNETT: Brian W. Burnett appearing 
on behalf of Central Valley Water Reclamation 
Faci1i ty. 
MR. GINSBERG: Michael Ginsberg will also 
be appearing for the Division of Public Utilities. 
COM. STEWART: Any other appearances? 
The Commission has spent considerable amount of time 
discussing, debating, considering this matter before 
we initiated this rate case and we think that it 
would be helpful if we were to commence this matter 
by giving the parties some of our thoughts on it. 
Afterwards, we will go ahead and respond to any 
questions that you may have and then go ahead and 
set a schedule for this matter. 
First of all, we need to note that this rate 
case will be the first Mountain Fuel rate case since 
1984. The Commission feels that a period of five, 
five and a half years between rate cases is probably 
too long. We have considered for a long time the 
possibility of requiring all utilities in the state 
to make annual filings with the Commission that 
would glv*e us information th&t would help us to 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 
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1 understand whether or not a rate case was needed. 
2 It's something we have not yet accomplished, 
3 We may yet, but in the absence of that, we think 
4 that rate cases, again, with four or five years 
5 interceding is too long and that is one of the 
6 reasons why this matter has been initiated by the 
7 Commission. 
8 We would also like to point out that it will be 
9 the first rate case since the corporate 
10 reorganization which took place in the fall of 1984. 
11 For those two reasons, the Commission has ordered 
12 this rate case and we would like to make it clear 
13 from this point on that it is our intention that the 
14 burden of establishing rates will be on Mountain 
15 Fuel Supply. 
16 This will be unlike the rate case that we 
17 undertook last year with US West Communications 
18 wherein the burden was carried by the Division. It 
19 is our intention that Mountain Fuel Supply will make 
20 a filing with the Commission establishing the 
21 appropriate rates for 1990. 
22 Secondly, the Commission would like to have a 
23 historical test year in this case, the test year 
24 being 1939. We realize that that is a significant 
25 issue and that there may be some who w aid disagree. 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 
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Accordingly, if a party wishes to request a test 
year other than 1989, we would ask that they quickly 
motion up a hearing on that specific issue. 
We would point out, however, that it is the 
Company's strong preference that we go with the 1989 
test year and we believe that the precedence that we 
established with the US West case which had a 
historical test year as well as the Utah Power & 
Light rate case that we are currently engaged in and 
the Utah Power & Light rate case that we will have 
in 1990 will both use historical test years also. 
So we believe the precedence has been set. We 
would like to point out that as was noted in the 
notice of prehearing that one of the significant 
issues that we want all parties to be concerned with 
is that of the affiliated relations of Mountain Fuel 
Supply. 
We would specifically ask that the Division 
undertake an analysis of whether the Wexpro 
agreement is helping or hurting the ratepayers of 
this state. We would note that the Questar order, 
the order dated October 1st, 1984 in docket number 
84-057-10 which was the request of the Company to 
reorganize itself into its current structure, in 
tlrat ord^s, the Commission listed a number of 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 
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1 conditions for approval of that corporate 
2 restructur ing. 
3 In item number 3, in particular, addresses the 
4 questions of affiliates and it says "Goods and 
5 services provided to the utility corporation by the 
6 holding company Questar or its subsidiaries shall be 
7 either on a preferential basis or at a minimum on an 
8 'arm's length' basis and shall not exceed the market 
9 rate for comparable goods and services except as 
10 otherwise governed by the Wexpro stipulation and 
11 agreement or approved by the Commission," 
12 We would ask that all of the parties including 
13 Mountain Fuel Supply be prepared to respond to 
14 whether or not that condition has been met. I would 
15 also, if I may, point out to the Company that this 
16 Commission in its recently completed US West case 
17 took great exception to the Company in that case 
18 making it difficult for the Division and the 
19 Committee to investigate the affiliated relations. 
20 We would hope that you would review that part 
21 of our order and that we will not have that problem 
22 reoccur in this case. 
23 On the question of cost of capital, another 
24 item that was mentioned in our prehearing order, I 
25 think the question that we would like to have 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 
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addressed is, does the current corporate structure 
affect the business risk of Questar, therefore, 
increasing the cost of capital to the ratepayers of 
Mountain Fuel Supply. 
Again, I would note that this is the first rate 
case since the corporate restructuring. This will 
be the first opportunity for that issue to be 
addressed. 
Finally, in the area of cost of service, it is 
the intention of the Commission that all of the ad 
hoc decisions that we have made over the last few 
years; for example, the approval of the 
transportation rate, the approval of an 
environmental rate and so on, will be examined in 
this rate case under the cost of service category, 
that everything is open; everything shall should be 
addressed. 
If a party wishes to argue that the five cent 
surcharge on transportation is inappropriate, they 
have the right to do so though they will be met with 
others who will disagree, we are assuming, but in 
any event, we would hope that you would understand 
that all cost of service issues are wide open in 
this case* 
I believe either Commissioner Byrne or 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 
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1 Commissioner Mecham may have something they want to 
2 add to what I just went through. 
3 COM. MECHAM: Mr. Ginsberg or Ms. Noda, I 
4 was told by Doug Kirk of our staff that at some 
5 point George Compton from the Division had worked on 
6 a gas optimization model. Ifm wondering if that can 
7 or ought to be part of this rate case as we review 
8 affiliate relationships. 
9 MR. GINSBERG: Do you want me to answer 
10 or respond? 
11 COM. MECHAM: Yes, please. 
12 MR. GINSBERG: There is a gas 
13 optimization model that was developed by Dr. Compton 
14 and was used in the transportation case and I 
15 J believe other cases. If I could, maybe I can answer 
16 the question really throwing it back to you. 
17 This is a non-gas cost rate case and the gas 
18 mix or the optimization of the Mountain Fuel Supply 
19 gas versus Questar gas is and has been an issue in 
20 pass- through cases where we have addressed a 
21 number of pass-through cases, the optimization of 
22 the use of D24 gas or Mountain Fuel Supply's own 
23 gas in relationship to the pipeline gas that they 
24 take under their FERC tariffs. 
25 The question I juess is, does the Commission 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 
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desire that we would address that in a non-gas cost 
case or in a pass-through case where the gas costs 
of Mountain Fuel Supply are at issue? 
In this case the affiliated relationship or the 
gas cost transactions are not directly before the 
Commission, but would be directly before the 
Commission for purposes of setting rates in a 
pass-through case. 
COM. MECHAM: My response to that would 
be that I think it would be more appropriate in this 
case because as we are reviewing the various 
relationships between and among the affiliate 
interests of this company, it would have at least 
indirect application, even in a non-gas cost case. 
In a pass-through case, grant it, my experience 
with the pass-through case is minimal, but it seems 
that there's not enough time to really address the 
issue and it seems that there's more time to do it 
here . 
MR. GINSBERG: I don't know how long it 
would take to do that kind of study, but it 
certainly could be done. 
COM. STEWART: Let's presume it will be 
done then. 
COM. BYRNE: I think probably the 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 
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emphasis, Mr, Ginsberg, ought to be on the structure 
of how gas is acquired rather than the specifics 
that we would see in a pass-through case. 
I also think that one of the problems in 
regulating this company is that we deal with the 
issues in a piece meal fashion. As Commissioner 
Stewart indicated, we haven't had a rate case for 
five years and we have had numerous pass-through 
cases dealing with specifically the issues of gas at 
that time. 
We also attempt to follow the proceedings at 
FERC with Questar pipeline, but in terms of a 
comprehensive analysis of how this gas delivery 
system is working for the ratepayer, we just haven't 
had a chance to really do that. 
So it may be that the Division will have to sit 
back and think about this for a little while and 
then come back to us if you really think it's -- and 
perhaps explain to us how you think this ought to be 
approached. I think the reference specifically to 
the gas acquisition model, I'm not sure myself how 
to utilize that in this case. 
MR. GINSBERG: The kind of studies that 
we used thai ior were I believe with respect to like 
whether or not the amount of D24 gas was being 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 11 
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takenf should be increased and whether or not the 
mix between Mountain Fuel Supply's own gas, the 
amount that they take and the amount that they take 
under their FERC contract as through Questar 
pipeline, what is the best mix for that. Those are 
the kinds of studies I think we have done in the 
pas t. 
COM. BYRNE: I think what we are asking 
for here in terms of the affiliate relationships is 
to step back from that a bit and take a look at the 
entire picture of how gas is acquired for the 
ratepayer and if it's being acquired in the best 
interest of the ratepayer. Whether we need to 
specifically address that model or not, I'm not 
sure . 
MR. BURNETT: The model was utilized to 
analyze whether or not gas transportation was 
appropriate and to the degree the gas transportation 
is a five percent per decatherm charge, perhaps the 
model would be of some assistance. 
COM. BYRNE: I guess the only other 
things that I recall from previous cases that were 
addressed that we haven't mentioned so far were in 
terms of the services provided to Mountain Fuel 
Supply by its subsidiaries, by its corporate family 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 
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1 members, real estate services, computer services, 
2 the various legal services, I believe the various 
3 services that are provided to the utility arm by 
4 other affiliates within the Questar family and how 
5 the Division has reviewed those and whether those 
6 are appropriate. 
7 MR. GINSBERG: All of those type of 
8 affiliate relationships that you have talked about 
9 were the type that we would be reviewing in this 
10 case with respect to corporate overheads, computers 
11 and other services that are provided by the parent 
12 company. 
13 COM. STEWART: Do any of the parties have 
14 any questions of the Commission at this time? Mr. 
15 Walgren? 
16 MR. WALGREN: Yes, a couple of questions. 
17 One issue that's just been raised is and I haven't 
18 had a chance to look carefully at the statute, but 
19 does the 240 days start to run from the date that 
20 the Commission's order was issued in this or the 
21 date that the filing was actually made by Mountain 
22 Fuel? Does anyone know that offhand? 
23 COM. STEWART: I believe it's from the 
24 date of filing by Mountain Fuel. 
25 MR. GINSBERG: I A ink it depends also 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 
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what the filing requests if anything. The 240 days 
only applies to rate increases and does not apply to 
rate decreases or status quo, so it really depends 
on that if there's a statutory time period applied. 
MR. WALGREN: The other issue that the 
Committee would like raised is in the UP&L case 
that's set for next year, there are some filing, 
uniform filing requirements that are being proposed 
based on Carl Mowers study. The Committee would 
like the filing of Mountain Fuel to also comply with 
those requirements. 
COM. STEWART: Those uniform filing 
requirements probably will not be known for months 
by the Commission and I don't think we want to delay 
this matter. I think we have just got to have the 
Company make a filing, as I indicated at the 
beginning, to justify its rates for 1990 and we will 
go from there. 
Hopefully, as I indicated today also, we will 
have those uniform filing requirements for all 
utilities in the state some day, but they are still 
some distance away from us. 
Are there any other questions? If not then, 
Ms. Drawe, can you give us an idea of when the 
Company can make its filing? 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 14 
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MS, DRAWE: Based on the Company's long 
term commitment to a future test year for rate 
cases, we had discussed the filing of an application 
on or before March 1st. 
I think we need to explore the correct test 
year and maybe we would need some additional time if 
ultimately the historical year is the filing that we 
are required to make. 
COM. STEWART: But you cannot make a 
filing before March 1st? 
MS. DRAWEe: We could. It's our 
understanding that you do want a full investigation 
of all of the normal rate case issues and we feel in 
order to do a thorough job and to put together an 
application that meets the requirements that you 
have set up that that's a reasonable time for us to 
do i t. 
We are coming into a holiday period. We could 
do it sooner if you felt there was some benefit to 
speeding up the process. 
COM. BYRNE: Ms. Drawe, one of the 
problems with that is that we have scheduled already 
a rate case for PacifiCorp next year which will be 
getting a filing in the March timeframe. I at least 
had hoped we could move at a much more rapid 
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schedule than that. 
It may be that some of the things that have 
been said here today affect how the parties would 
approach this case and it may be that we need to 
have a technical conference or discussion among the 
parties about various issues before we can look at 
setting the schedule. I'm not sure. 
COM. STEWART: I would anticipate that 
even if we were to push you, you couldn't move it up 
any more than what, a month or so, so we are going 
to be, regardless, on almost an identical track with 
Utah Power & Light in any event. 
MS. DRAWE: That's likely. 
MR. WALGREN: For the Committee also, to 
participate in this case we are going to have to get 
a supplemental appropriation and I'm told that the 
soonest that we can let a contract would be March 
15th to do that, so we are also looking if we 
participate in this at about the same schedule. 
COM. STEWART: Let's go off the record 
for just a mi nute. 
(Discussion off the record) 
COM. STEWART: Let's go back on the 
record. First of all, Ms. Drawe, are you confident 
that the Company is going to be arguing for a future 
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test year? 
MS. DRAWE: Ninety nine percent 
conf ident, yes. 
COM. STEWART: Then let's go ahead and 
set a hearing date for that so that we can hear tha 
issue as soon as we can. Will you be prepared to 
argue that on the 21st? 
MS. DRAWE: Yes. 
COM. STEWART: Okay. Let's set that 
matter for law and motion on the 21st. 
MR. GINSBERG: Isn't it more in the ligh 
of an evidentiary issue than a legal issue? 
COM. STEWART: Not really. The question 
is whether or not the Commission is going to order 
them to file a historical .test year or a future tes 
year. That to me is a legal issue. 
COM. BYRNE: I don't interpret it as a 
legal issue. I mean, clearly within the statute we 
can have historical test years or future test years 
I think the argument in a practical sense what --
COM. STEWART: Policy issue. 
COM. BYRNE: Policy issue. Which one 
makes more sense. The Chairman has just indicated 
that had we had -- well, in the past the precedent 
has been future test year. We have with the other 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 
(801) 530-6693 
fixed utilities right now historic test year cases 
and.we have a period where we are seeing lesser 
inflation, less pressure on rates and those kinds of 
things that were the argument for future test years 
in the past. 
So I don't see it as a legal issue if the 
Company can convince us that the future test year is 
the way to go as a practical matter, that's what 
they need to do. 
MS. DRAWE: Could I ask if you are 
basically putting forth a new policy that the 
historic test year is what you want in any case or 
are you basing it on the facts at the present time? 
You mentioned that inflation is not rampant at this 
time . 
COM. BYRNE: I would hate to think we got 
tied up in the rulemaking argument here about 
whether we are making a rule for historic test year. 
I think that in the case of the other two fixed 
utilities, we decided it was appropriate to deal 
with a historic test year. The companies agreed and 
we went ahead with it. 
If Mountain Fuel Supply feels strongly that a 
future test jear is the way we ought to go, let's 
reevaluate that. We haven't done it for five years 
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or more and obviously the conditions in 1984 were 
quite different than they are now. 
COM. MECHAM: I would characterize it as 
an exercise of Commission discretion. I mean it's 
discretionary whether we go with a future year or 
not. 
MS. DRAWE: Would it be subject to review 
in future cases? 
COM. STEWART: Yes. 
MR. REEDER: Does the Commission 
anticipate making a record for the exercise of its 
discretion or does it prefer to do it in the comment 
rulemaking process to exercise its discretion? 
COM. MECHAM: I believe we are setting a 
hearing to do that for the 21st. 
MR. REEDER: Evidentiary hearing to make 
a record upon which to make a decision and a 
judiciary process? 
COM. MECHAM: That appears to me to be 
exactly what we are doing, Mr. Reeder. 
COM. BYRNE: We have made a decision, Mr. 
Reeder, and we are giving the parties an opportunity 
to tell us why we are mistaken in doing that. We do 
believe this is a discretionary matter. 
MR. WALGREN: Wouldn't that require the 
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presentation of some evidence, thoughf on what's 
likely to be the most useful way in determining 
rates and in setting rates? Isn't there an 
evidentiary issue there? The question of whether or 
not the Commission is abusing its discretion or not 
in basing the test year on --
COM. STEWART: I think the statute 
clearly gives us the discretion as to whether we go 
with a future test year or historical test year. We 
have decided we want a historical test year. 
We willf however, allow any party to come in 
and argue that a future test year is more 
appropriate. We will set a hearing for November 
21st to hear that on the law and motion calendar. 
We will set it at 10:00 on October 21st -- November 
21st. 
Ms. Drawe, if the Commission was to hold that 
we were going to stick with a historical test year, 
can the Company still make its filing by March 1st? 
MS. DRAWE: It's my understanding that 
no, we could not, that we would need an additional 
month to take the year end figures that were final 
and audited and made available which would be early 
February and that then an April 1st filing would be 
more reasonable. 
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COM. STEWART: Well, we may end up 
getting off the track with Utah Power & Liiht in the 
direction opposite from what we considered possible, 
I think the question of when you should file 
will have to await a decision by the Commission on a 
historical versus future test year. So we will 
probably discuss that matter again on the 21st so 
that those of you who are interested in that issue 
should be here. 
I'm talking about the schedule, regardless of 
whether you intend to argue for or against the 
historical test year. With that in mind then, are 
there any other questions at this time? 
MR. GINSBERG: Would we use the 21st as 
a time where we can more define the type of -- come 
back to you with what you have given us today with a 
more specific approach on the type of studies that 
we would be doing? 
COM. STEWART: That would be helpful. 
MR. GINSBERG: With a more detailed 
schedule? 
COM. STEWART: Yes and again, if there 
are any other questions that you may have in terms 
of what the Commission intends this case to include, 
you could raise them on the 21st. 
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COM. BYRNE: We have got sort of a split 
burden I think in this case in terms of the 
determination of rates, we have indicated the 
Company has the burden to come forward with the 
information on which to base rates going forward. 
The Division's burden is probably in the area 
of the other things that we have asked for and 
that's the analysis of affiliate relations and those 
kinds of issues. So I think perhaps it would be 
very helpful if the Division could come back. 
MR. GINSBERG: You are not going to 
require the Company to put forth any affirmative 
filing on their affiliated relations? 
COM. BYRNE: Well, I'm not sure what an 
affirmative filing from the Company on those 
affiliate relations would be. My personal view is 
that it's the Division that's going to do an 
investigation and the Company will provide the 
information as requested by the Division, but the 
Company has made its affirmative case. It has its 
company organized the way it deems is appropriate 
and it seems to me that's a given. 
COM. STEWART: Mr. Ginsberg, I would, 
however, take the view that in light of the 
paragraph 3 from the order in the paragraph of the 
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1984 case that I read to you earlier that the 
Company has the affirmative responsibility to 
establish that the goods and services provided to 
tne utility by the holding company or its 
subsidiaries are either on a preferential basis or 
on an arm's length basis, so I think they have the 
burden of justifying those relationships pursuant to 
that order . 
MR. GINSBERG: I have two other comments. 
First, maybe the Company could provide use of 
historical information with certain forecasts for 
the rest of 1989 and then provide actual data as it 
becomes available. I don't know if that would 
hinder the process or speed up the process, but it 
certainly is I think something that should be 
considered . 
We do have certain amounts of actual data 
available and we don't -- we have obviously a 
forecast for the rest of 1989. Whether or not you 
could provide actuals with forecasts for the rest of 
this year and update those to actual results when 
they are available. 
COM. STEWART: Again, Mr. Ginsberg, 
tnat's going to await our decision on the test year. 
MR. GINSBERG: I guess my question was to 
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Mountain Fuel whether they could provide that sooner 
in that format rather than waiting until their books 
are closed for 1989 --
COM. STEWART: You mean if we were to 
decide to go with a historical test year and tell 
them to file it February lstf for example, with 
certain number of months of acutals and a certain 
number of months of forecasting? 
MR, GINSBERG: I don't know whether that 
would speed up the — the actuals have to be 
converted into a test year. Second, I was wondering 
if the Commission could provide any additional 
comments of the type of analysis that you wanted us 
to do with respect to the Wexpro agreement? 
COM. STEWART: Well, again, I think the 
standard was stated by me when I read it to you, Mr. 
Ginsberg, and that is we want you to tell us whether 
or not the Wexpro agreement is helping or hurting 
the ratepayer of the state. That's pretty open 
ended, I realize, but I can't be any more specific. 
MR. GINSBERG: Okay. 
COM. STEWART: The Wexpro agreement has 
been in effect eight years. It has had substantial 
impact on the ratepayers of this state one way or 
the other; perhaps it's neutral. 
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The only people who can tell us that would be 
the Division and it will come under close scrutiny 
by the other parties in this proceeding and at the 
end of the case, we hopefully will be able to say, 
"Yes, the Wexpro agreement is good, bad or 
indifferent." I'm sorry I can't be more specific. 
Are there any additional questions? 
MR. DODGE: Commissioner Stewart, could 
we request that those appearing today be deemed 
intervenors without filing formal pleadings? 
COM. STEWART: Yes. 
MR. DODGE: Thank you. 
MR. REEDER: Thank you. 
COM. BYRNE: Could we ask the Company 
then to also respond on November 21st relative to 
the question Mr. Ginsberg asked about whether if we 
do go forward with a historic test year, the Company 
could make a filing of so many months of actuals as 
normalized and so many projected because that will 
affect the schedule. 
The Division would be able to move forward more 
rapidly after the Company's filing if they had 
information prior to the Company's filing that they 
could be working with. Otherwise, we will see a 
longer timeframe requested by the Division between 
WENDY K. RANDALL, CSR, RPR 25 
(801) 530-6693 
the Company's filing and when we can actually have a 
case • 
MR. GINSBERG: It was our intention to 
begin requesting information immediately and we 
would provide those to the Company as we have those 
requested. Many of them will relate to 1989, 
normalizing that as a test year. 
COM. STEWART: Are there any other 
questions at this time? 
MR. GINSBERG: I had one other comment. 
Should some mechanism be provided in order to 
provide a public notice of this proceeding? Should 
it be published or should that wait until there's an 
actual filing by the Company? 
COM. STEWART: I think it can wait until 
the actual filing, Mr. Ginsberg. I don't know that 
a public notice at this time is going to do anybody 
any good and we are not going to see an actual 
filing until March 1st, maybe even later. 
I mean, again, we are here today, but the 
actual commencement of this proceeding does not 
commence until the filing by the Company, so there 
will be plenty of time for any party who may be 
interested in this case to examine the filing and 
determine whether or not their interests are 
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affected . 
COM. BYRNE: I think notice has already 
gone out to all of the parties that we know of that 
have an interest in this proceeding, 
MS. DRAWE: Could I respond to Mr. 
Ginsberg? He's suggested that he'd like to start 
data requests coming to Mountain Fuel right away. I 
think if there's interest in our having a timely 
filing, there will be a lot of work going into the 
preparation of that filing and to be having numerous 
data requests during the same period will make it 
more difficult to tend to the task at hand of 
getting the filing in, so I would suggest that those 
may be delayed somewhat although certainly for their 
initial reports there may be some information that 
they would need. 
MR. GINSBERG: I think there's a number 
of benefits of us providing them data requests as 
soon as possible. Some information they could 
incorporate that into their filing, information that 
they know that we are interested in receiving or if 
it's -- I don't think we are suggesting that we 
would cause any delay at all in them making the 
filing whenever they felt it was required to be made 
and I think we are just say* ,g if we started our 
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process now, it would speed up the entire proceeding 
rather than us waiting until April to even begin. 
COM. STEWART: Let me ask this. Let me 
request that the parties who desire to do so meet 
informally after we are through here and set a date 
where you can get together and discuss those types 
of issues between now and the 21st. 
I don't want the Division to be on a fishing 
expedition requesting information that's speculative 
or even forecasted if we are going to have a 
completely actual historical test year, for example, 
but on the other hand, I think your points are 
legitimate, Mr. Ginsberg. I think you ought to meet 
together and try to discuss that and then if you 
have any problems, bring them up again on the 21st, 
if you would, Ms. Drawe. 
MR. GINSBERG: When you were referring to 
a historical test year, were you including known and 
measurable changes that would have occurred outside 
of the test year? 
COM. STEWART: Mr. Ginsberg, we have a 
policy on known and measurable changes that we refer 
to quite consistently in the US West order and we 
will abide by that. Does that answer your question? 
MR. GINSBERG: That's fine. 
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COM. STEWART: Are there any other 
questions at this time? If not, we will be in 
recess until November 21st at 10:00 a.m. 
(Whereupon the preceedings were 
concluded) 
* * * * 
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